Cyber Threat Watch by AlienVault OTX

Cyber Threat Watch adalah fitur yang memantau dan menampilkan ancaman siber terbaru. Fitur ini menyajikan informasi tentang kampanye ancaman, deskripsi serangan, serta indikator kompromi (IoCs) seperti file hash dan domain yang terlibat, untuk membantu dalam mendeteksi dan merespons ancaman siber secara lebih efektif. Informasi yang ditampilkan di halaman ini selalu diperbarui secara otomatis untuk memastikan Anda mendapatkan data ancaman terkini.

Nama Pulse Deskripsi IoCs
Attacks by APT-C-60 Group Exploiting Legitimate Services The APT-C-60 group targeted organizations in Japan and East Asia with a sophisticated attack campaign. The attack begins with a phishing email containing a Google Drive link to download a VHDX file. This file includes an LNK file that executes a downloader, which then retrieves a backdoor called SpyGrace. The attackers use legitimate services like Bitbucket and StatCounter for command and control. The malware achieves persistence through COM hijacking and employs various techniques to evade detection. The campaign likely targeted multiple East Asian countries, using similar tactics across different attacks.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 a78550e6101938c7f5e8bfb170db4db2
FileHash-SHA1 0830ef2fe7813ccf6821cad71a22e4384b4d02b4
FileHash-SHA1 1e5920a6b79a93b1fa8daca32e13d1872da208ee
FileHash-SHA1 33dba9c156f6ceda40aefa059dea6ef19a767ab2
FileHash-SHA1 3affa67bc7789fd349f8a6c9e28fa1f0c453651f
FileHash-SHA1 4508d0254431df5a59692d7427537df8a424dbba
FileHash-SHA1 4589b97225ba3e4a4f382540318fa8ce724132d5
FileHash-SHA1 5d3160f01920a6b11e3a23baec1ed9c6d8d37a68
FileHash-SHA1 5ed4d42d0dcc929b7f1d29484b713b3b2dee88e3
FileHash-SHA1 65300576ba66f199fca182c7002cb6701106f91c
FileHash-SHA1 6cf281fc9795d5e94054cfe222994209779d0ba6
FileHash-SHA1 783cd767b496577038edbe926d008166ebe1ba8c
FileHash-SHA1 79e41b93b540f6747d0d2c3a22fd45ab0eac09ab
FileHash-SHA1 7e8aeba19d804b8f2e7bffa7c6e4916cf3dbee62
FileHash-SHA1 8abd64e0c4515d27fae4de74841e66cfc4371575
FileHash-SHA1 8ebddd79bb7ef1b9fcbc1651193b002bfef598fd
FileHash-SHA1 b1e0abfdaa655cf29b44d5848fab253c43d5350a
FileHash-SHA1 c198971f84a74e972142c6203761b81f8f854d2c
FileHash-SHA1 cc9cd337b28752b8ba1f41f773a3eac1876d8233
FileHash-SHA1 d94448afd4841981b1b49ecf63db3b63cb208853
FileHash-SHA1 fadd8a6c816bebe3924e0b4542549f55c5283db8
FileHash-SHA1 fd6c16a31f96e0fd65db5360a8b5c179a32e3b8e
URL http://103.187.26.176/a78550e6101938c7f5e8bfb170db4db2/command.asp
URL http://103.187.26.176/a78550e6101938c7f5e8bfb170db4db2/listen.asp
URL http://103.187.26.176/a78550e6101938c7f5e8bfb170db4db2/result.asp
URL http://103.187.26.176/a78550e6101938c7f5e8bfb170db4db2/server.asp
URL http://103.187.26.176/a78550e6101938c7f5e8bfb170db4db2/update.asp
URL https://threatbook.io/blog/Analysis-of-APT-C-60-Attack-on-South-Korea
Guess Who’s Back - The Return of ANEL in the Recent Earth Kasha Spear-phishing Campaign in 2024 A spear-phishing campaign targeting Japan since June 2024 has been identified, featuring the reemergence of the ANEL backdoor, previously used by APT10 until 2018. The campaign, attributed to Earth Kasha, targets individuals in political organizations, research institutions, and international relations-related entities. The attack utilizes various infection methods, including macro-enabled documents and shortcut files. The malware suite includes ROAMINGMOUSE, ANELLDR, and updated versions of ANEL. Post-exploitation activities involve information gathering and, in some cases, deployment of the more advanced NOOPDOOR backdoor. This campaign marks a shift in Earth Kasha's tactics, moving from exploiting vulnerabilities in edge devices to targeting individuals through spear-phishing.
Type Indicator
YARA 35221e72ad38c2448c31239dc895ed2687ea669f
Matrix Unleashes A New Widespread DDoS Campaign A new widespread Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) campaign orchestrated by a threat actor named Matrix has been uncovered. The operation combines public scripts, brute-force attacks, and exploitation of weak credentials to create a botnet capable of global disruption. Matrix targets vulnerabilities and misconfigurations across internet-connected devices, particularly IoT and enterprise systems. The campaign demonstrates how accessible tools and minimal technical knowledge can enable large-scale cyberattacks. Despite showing Russian affiliation, the absence of Ukrainian targets suggests a focus on financial gain rather than political motives. The threat actor is actively targeting both development and production servers, marking an evolution in DDoS activities.
Type Indicator
CVE CVE-2014-8361
CVE CVE-2017-17106
CVE CVE-2017-17215
CVE CVE-2017-18368
CVE CVE-2018-10561
CVE CVE-2018-10562
CVE CVE-2018-9995
CVE CVE-2021-20090
CVE CVE-2022-30075
CVE CVE-2022-30525
CVE CVE-2024-27348
FileHash-MD5 0e3a1683369ab94dc7d9c02adbed9d89
FileHash-MD5 53721f2db3eb5d84ecd0e5755533793a
FileHash-MD5 5a66b6594cb5da4e5fcb703c7ee04083
FileHash-MD5 76975e8eb775332ce6d6ca9ef30de3de
FileHash-MD5 866c52bc44c007685c49f5f7c51e05ca
FileHash-MD5 9181d876e1fcd8eb8780d3a28b0197c9
FileHash-MD5 9c9ea0b83a17a5f87a8fe3c1536aab2f
FileHash-MD5 c332b75871551f3983a14be3bfe2fe79
FileHash-MD5 c7d7e861826a4fa7db2b92b27c36e5e2
FileHash-MD5 d653fa6f1050ac276d8ded0919c25a6f
FileHash-MD5 df521f97af1591efff0be31a7fe8b925
FileHash-SHA1 6136fe4df8c0cce502d50671def6b6bc2850a38d
FileHash-SHA1 84791db42a6f321ea70cfcbf13913fa4e02533f8
FileHash-SHA1 8ba1f42c61e1bef97afb48b1e741c889cc0cad50
FileHash-SHA1 95a5ff1372f352434525a416570eef4379ebac19
FileHash-SHA1 ada6c6646cc86e12a09355944700debf8abd2a55
FileHash-SHA1 c72cd784e908c2026549be7439418f7d126936b9
FileHash-SHA256 0ee827d23752c2afc1b07e5312986703f63e05b8c4f1902f5db07bb494e4d057
FileHash-SHA256 2e7682abe30d93afb3bd9dee0011c450c1d72d727151344b8b7360441571e007
FileHash-SHA256 424058facc8f16fd578190a612bc3f9178f5e393d345c2330c39436abb4d1142
FileHash-SHA256 8dfe94a1b02d1330886ad4458b32db3da4b872f9c2116657840de499fee5438a
FileHash-SHA256 aee08f24f2e0be5af8b9a7947e845e8364be2f8b5ff874fbc3e7a4c81ecdad83
FileHash-SHA256 fa1b9e78b59cdb26d98da8b00fe701697a55ae9ea3bd11b00695cfbba2b67a7a
hostname sponsored-ate.gl.at.ply.gg
Regarding the Cyberhaven chrome extension compromise, there are other... Several Chrome extensions have been compromised, including those related to Cyberhaven. The affected extensions are linked to multiple suspicious domains resolving to the same IP address as cyberhavenext[.]pro. Some confirmed compromised extensions are listed with their corresponding URLs. Users are advised to search for these extensions in their environments and monitor for any traffic to the IP address 149.28.124[.]84. This information suggests a widespread attack targeting browser extensions, potentially putting users' data and privacy at risk.
Type Indicator
IPv4 149.28.124.84
domain castorus.info
domain censortracker.pro
domain iobit.pro
domain moonsift.store
domain policyextension.info
domain primusext.pro
domain uvoice.live
domain wayinai.live
domain yujaverity.info
domain bookmarkfc.info
domain vpncity.live
domain parrottalks.info
domain readermodeext.info
Warning of a surge in activity associated with FICORA and Kaiten botnets FortiGuard Labs researchers observed increased activity from two botnets in late 2024: the Mirai variant 'FICORA' and the Kaiten variant 'CAPSAICIN'. Both target vulnerabilities in D-Link devices, particularly through the HNAP interface, allowing remote command execution. The FICORA botnet downloads and executes a shell script to infect Linux systems, while CAPSAICIN uses a downloader script to target various Linux architectures. FICORA includes DDoS capabilities using multiple protocols. CAPSAICIN appears to be a variant of Keksec group botnets. The attacks exploit vulnerabilities that were patched years ago, highlighting the importance of regular device updates and monitoring.
Type Indicator
CVE CVE-2015-2051
CVE CVE-2019-10891
CVE CVE-2022-37056
CVE CVE-2024-33112
IPv4 192.110.247.46
IPv4 87.10.220.221
Phishing for Banking Information A recent phishing campaign targeting Bank of Montreal (BMO) customers has been identified. The scam involves text messages purporting to be from BMO, asking recipients to verify their credit card information. Key indicators of the fraudulent nature include the use of a non-official SMS number, incorrect display of card numbers, and a malicious website with spelling errors. The domain 'bmo-securltyverlfy1.com' was registered on December 11, 2024, and is associated with an IP address linked to 81 other domains targeting various Canadian institutions. The campaign exploits the holiday season to deceive users into revealing sensitive banking information.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA256 c76cbf6e22734f177e024e1fee02ed17a53413e0dfee02c6a6601be28280b167
domain bmo-securltyverlfy1.com
Gaming Engines: An Undetected Playground for Malware Loaders Check Point Research uncovered a new technique exploiting the Godot Engine to execute malicious GDScript code, remaining undetected by most antivirus tools. The technique has been used since June 2024, potentially infecting over 17,000 machines. A loader called GodLoader employs this method and is distributed via the Stargazers Ghost Network on GitHub. The technique allows cross-platform targeting of Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, and iOS devices. Researchers demonstrated successful payload drops on Linux and MacOS. This approach could potentially target over 1.2 million users of Godot-developed games through malicious mods or downloadable content.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 2078f4397407b82d92a9aec7ca409726
FileHash-MD5 218a8f2b3041327d8a5756f3a245f83b
FileHash-MD5 33ab33dfde13e2f89482bff662349c82
FileHash-MD5 480c9ce7b6f60aa42e9a5886da844b67
FileHash-MD5 5b88526524374dc75cb75ac9dda020f8
FileHash-MD5 61d3abff46a6bd2946925542c7d30397
FileHash-MD5 639864b85bd3ec6d8bb00f7e08d145d9
FileHash-MD5 6501ebb8f3472c28c2396b32dee370f7
FileHash-MD5 7c91efbcaa02854d951ac79000b77017
FileHash-MD5 8e09c87e2e69a9b58341050b5e38134d
FileHash-MD5 9984d0a0b5388a08ddd4387e247d50da
FileHash-MD5 9a4ac6322a57b14acb3157c9cd83cd76
FileHash-MD5 9bd3fecfb842b3d4d7f02500e78211b2
FileHash-MD5 bef08eff4910a50e6997fbe21bb8b594
FileHash-MD5 c7d5a8188ea302ab78d6a529e90d43b8
FileHash-MD5 d3575a49bea6bd54a543d720412134b3
FileHash-MD5 e41f0625a4574d3424e7bfa11a1f6416
FileHash-MD5 e66311c87c39ec8c25379305b5ae724b
FileHash-MD5 ee60134b5708931be25b58780c0ff8a5
FileHash-MD5 efbc9a5174dc45bf0d631c4faedd17a8
FileHash-SHA1 1fed80a136e67a5b7b6846010a5853400886ee9c
FileHash-SHA1 9687e3b7ca67baf2a82f76919d2b254dedc1e762
FileHash-SHA256 0d03c7c6335e06c45dd810fba6c52cdb9eafe02111da897696b83811bff0be92
FileHash-SHA256 260f06f0c6c1544afcdd9a380a114489ebdd041b846b68703158e207b7c983d6
FileHash-SHA256 3317b8e19e19218e5a7c77a47a76f36e37319f383b314b30179b837e46c87c45
FileHash-SHA256 604fa32b76dbe266da3979b7a49e3100301da56f0b58c13041ab5febe55354d2
FileHash-SHA256 6be9c015c82645a448831d9dc8fcae4360228f76dff000953a76e3bf203d3ec8
FileHash-SHA256 b1a351ee61443b8558934dca6b2fa9efb0a6d2d18bae61ace5a761596604dbfa
domain control.gd
domain name.is
RomCom exploits Firefox and Windows zero days in the wild ESET researchers discovered a critical zero-day vulnerability in Mozilla products, exploited by the Russia-aligned group RomCom. The vulnerability, CVE-2024-9680, allows code execution in Firefox, Thunderbird, and Tor Browser. When chained with another Windows vulnerability, CVE-2024-49039, it enables arbitrary code execution without user interaction. The exploit chain delivered RomCom's backdoor in a widespread campaign targeting Europe and North America. Mozilla quickly patched the vulnerability within a day of notification. The Windows vulnerability, a privilege escalation bug in the Task Scheduler, was later patched by Microsoft. This sophisticated attack demonstrates RomCom's capabilities in developing or obtaining stealthy exploitation techniques.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA1 abb54c4751f97a9fc1c9598fed1ec9fb9e6b1db6
URL https://journalctd.live/JfWb4OrQPLh
domain 1drv.us
domain correctiv.sbs
domain cwise.store
domain devolredir.com
domain journalctd.live
domain redirconnectwise.cloud
domain redircorrectiv.com
domain redjournal.cloud
DigiEver Fix That IoT Thing! In mid-November 2024, the Akamai SIRT discovered an uptick in activity targeting the URI /cgi-bin/cgi_main.cgi in our global network of honeypots. This activity appears to be part of a recent ongoing Mirai-based malware campaign dating back to at least October 2024. Further investigation into this campaign revealed a new botnet that calls itself the “Hail C*ck Botnet” that’s been active since at least September 2024. Using a Mirai malware variant that incorporates ChaCha20 and XOR decryption algorithms, it has been seen compromising vulnerable Internet of Things (IoT) devices in the wild, such as the DigiEver DVR, and TP-Link devices through CVE-2023-1389.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 da3b2e781acf9fd712d0adb4f7d6f989
FileHash-SHA1 3472c3ffa4b2049110a8de71a416d8d5235ee6a0
FileHash-SHA256 0d8c3289a2b21abb0d414e2c730d46081e9334a97b5e0b52b9a2f248c59a59ad
FileHash-SHA256 31813bb69e10b636c785358ca09d7f91979454dc6fc001f750bf03ad8bde8fe5
FileHash-SHA256 3c0eb5de2946c558159a6b6a656d463febee037c17a1f605330e601cfcd39615
FileHash-SHA256 a1b73a3fbd2e373a35d3745d563186b06857f594fa5379f6f7401d09476a0c41
FileHash-SHA256 b32390e3ed03b99419c736b2eb707886b9966f731e629f23e3af63ea7a91a7af
FileHash-SHA256 dec561cc19458ea127dc1f548fcd0aaa51db007fa8b95c353086cd2d26bfcf02
IPv4 104.37.188.76
IPv4 141.98.11.79
IPv4 149.50.106.25
IPv4 154.213.187.50
IPv4 154.216.17.126
IPv4 185.82.200.181
IPv4 193.233.193.45
IPv4 194.87.198.29
IPv4 195.133.92.51
IPv4 213.182.204.57
IPv4 31.13.248.89
IPv4 45.125.66.90
IPv4 45.202.35.24
IPv4 45.202.35.91
IPv4 5.35.104.31
IPv4 5.39.254.71
IPv4 81.29.149.178
IPv4 86.107.100.80
IPv4 88.151.195.22
IPv4 91.132.50.181
IPv4 91.149.218.232
IPv4 91.149.238.18
IPv4 95.214.53.205
domain catlovingfools.geek
domain hailcocks.ru
domain hikvision.geek
Espionage cluster Paper Werewolf engages in destructive behavior The Paper Werewolf cluster, also known as GOFFEE, has increased its activity, targeting Russian organizations in government, energy, finance, and media sectors. Their primary method involves phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments containing macros. The group has evolved from cyber espionage to actively disrupting compromised infrastructures. They utilize PowerShell scripts, custom malware, and post-exploitation frameworks like Mythic. The attackers employ techniques such as reverse shells, credential interception, and destructive actions like changing passwords and deleting registry keys. Their arsenal includes tools like PowerRAT, Owowa, and Chisel. The group's sophisticated approach combines open-source frameworks with custom implants, making detection challenging.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA256 13252199b18d5257a60f57de95d8c6be7d7973df7f957bca8c2f31e15fcc947b
FileHash-SHA256 37b3fa8a3a05e4aedb25eb38d9e4524722f28c21fac9f788f87113c5b9184ef5
FileHash-SHA256 804cd68f40d0bb93b6676447af719388e95cafd5a2b017a0386eb7de590ebf17
FileHash-SHA256 8ba4cd7ea29f990cb86291003f82239bfafe28910d080b5b7d3db78e83c1b6f3
FileHash-SHA256 fa8853aaa156485855b77a16a2f613d9f58d82ef63505be8b19563827089bf52
IPv4 185.244.182.87
IPv4 5.252.176.55
domain lobbyluxuries.com
Know Thy Enemy: A Novel November Case on Persistent Remote Access In early November 2024, a threat actor gained initial access to a network via brute-forcing a public-facing RD-Web instance. Using PsExec, they executed batch files across multiple machines to enable RDP connections and install a malicious MeshAgent. The actor renamed the MeshAgent to mimic a virtualization binary and disguised its server as a Windows Network Virtual Adapter. The attack involved lateral movement, privilege escalation, and credential access through WDigest manipulation. The threat actor's consistent tradecraft was observed in multiple environments, highlighting the importance of continuous threat hunting and feedback loops in security investigations. Lessons learned include hardening external perimeters, enforcing MFA, and deploying software allow-lists.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA256 fcea81909388611359bbaf41871300075e192a3246b9e1bebc5f3f0aaa2b2c9a
FileHash-SHA256 b629fe2363a23f7c0a6f40235ca25098321ba49bc397b36e2856a1ae76055c56
FileHash-SHA256 fdf51eba1b48ed4180dfbb66d8e299794998252517597aff4a44162183f7dcd9
Threat Campaign Targeting Palo Alto Networks Firewall Devices Observed Arctic Wolf has identified multiple intrusions across various industries involving Palo Alto Network firewall devices. The attacks likely exploit recently disclosed PAN-OS vulnerabilities CVE-2024-0012 and CVE-2024-9474 for initial access. Affected devices downloaded payloads including the Sliver C2 framework and coinminer binaries. Threat actors injected malicious commands into firewall login attempts, deployed PHP webshells, exfiltrated sensitive configuration files and credentials, and in some cases installed XMRig cryptocurrency miners. The campaign demonstrates rapid exploitation of newly disclosed vulnerabilities in perimeter devices. Defenders are advised to implement robust external monitoring, restrict management interfaces, and patch vulnerable systems promptly.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA256 a3092bfa4199def7fc525465895ee3784c6fcf55f0a7e9c8436c027e0f41cb4b
hostname img.dxyjg.com
hostname sys.traceroute.vip
Analyzing Malicious Intent in Python Code: A Case Study Two malicious packages, Zebo-0.1.0 and Cometlogger-0.1, were identified by an AI-driven OSS malware detection system. These packages contain Python scripts designed for surveillance, data exfiltration, and unauthorized control. Zebo-0.1.0 uses obfuscation techniques, keylogging, screen capturing, and data exfiltration to a remote server. It also implements a persistence mechanism to ensure re-execution upon system startup. Cometlogger-0.1 exhibits webhook manipulation, information theft from various platforms, anti-VM detection, dynamic file modification, and persistence mechanisms. Both packages pose significant security risks, including credential leaks and sensitive information theft. The analysis highlights the importance of cybersecurity awareness and robust defensive measures against such malicious code.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA256 4aeb0211bd6d9e7c74c09ac67812465f2a8e90e25fe04b265b7f289deea5db21
FileHash-SHA256 839d0cfcc52a130add70239b943d8c82c4234b064d6f996eeaae142f05cc9e85
FileHash-SHA256 e01c61dc52514b011c83c293cf19092c40cb606a28a87675b4f896be5afebed2
More SSH Fun! A Windows batch file has been discovered that abuses the ssh.exe tool in modern Windows versions to create a backdoor. The script adds a registry entry for persistence and uses SSH to set up a reverse tunnel, allowing remote access. It also downloads and executes a malicious file using a Dev Tunnels URL, a Microsoft feature similar to ngrok. The script disables host key verification and enables local command execution through SSH. While the specific malicious payload (Ghost.exe) is no longer available, it is suspected to be a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). This technique demonstrates the creative misuse of legitimate tools for malicious purposes.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA256 3172eb8283a3e82384e006458265b60001ba68c7982fda1b81053705496a999c
hostname vdch79w0-8000.inc1.devtunnels.ms
Modiloader From Obfuscated Batch File An investigation of a file named 'Albertsons_payment.GZ' revealed a sophisticated malware delivery chain. The file, initially disguised as an image, was actually a Windows Cabinet file containing an obfuscated batch script. This script employed string slicing techniques to reconstruct commands and used LOLbins like extrac32.exe to evade detection. The payload, identified as Modiloader, a Delphi-based malware, was extracted using certutil.exe. The final stage attempted to fetch additional content from a URL, but failed in the analysis environment. This attack demonstrates the use of complex obfuscation and living-off-the-land techniques to deliver malware.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 7afcba92a35ba26fcde12f3aba8ff7d8
FileHash-MD5 7cd592cb2f2179e188e9e99cb7c06bba
FileHash-MD5 dc156637aebf04336700a9bc71c78aad
FileHash-SHA1 8fe8577fc2ef8866c83ab163a8655ea777e6d4f4
FileHash-SHA1 f04b6d7ca8a838e63df18ac6254f7f24c6ecdbd1
FileHash-SHA256 29bda570966cf934b38ff7b1613f9330709307405391ced5452bd9cc63736331
FileHash-SHA256 baa12b649fddd77ef62ecd2b3169fab9bb5fbe78404175485f9a7fb48dc4456d
FileHash-SHA256 bc4cf21e25e9f429b8ea1fdc17061bc0eff0c1b44d83ff6c5da36c778ce62ade
domain swamfoxinnc.com
URL https://swamfoxinnc.com/233_Svcrhpjadgy
Cloud Atlas using a new backdoor, VBCloud, to steal data Cloud Atlas, a threat group active since 2014, has introduced a new backdoor called VBCloud in its latest campaign targeting Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The attack chain begins with phishing emails containing malicious documents exploiting CVE-2018-0802. The infection process involves downloading and executing an HTA file, which then deploys the VBShower backdoor. VBShower installs both VBCloud and PowerShower backdoors. VBCloud replicates previous capabilities, including downloading and executing malicious plugins, communicating with cloud servers, and performing various tasks. The campaign aims to steal data from victim devices, with VBCloud collecting system information and exfiltrating files. PowerShower is used for network reconnaissance and further infiltration.
Type Indicator
CVE CVE-2018-0802
FileHash-MD5 0139f32a523d453bc338a67ca45c224d
FileHash-MD5 016b6a035b44c1ad10d070abcdfe2f66
FileHash-MD5 01db58a1d0ec85adc13290a6290ad9d6
FileHash-MD5 0f37e1298e4c82098dc9318c7e65f9d2
FileHash-MD5 15fd46ac775a30b1963281a037a771b1
FileHash-MD5 160a65e830eb97aae6e1305019213558
FileHash-MD5 184cf8660af7538cd1cd2559a10b6622
FileHash-MD5 1af1f9434e4623b7046cf6360e0a520e
FileHash-MD5 1bfb9cba8aa23a401925d356b2f6e7ed
FileHash-MD5 21585d5881cc11ed1f615fdb2d7acc11
FileHash-MD5 242e86e658fe6ab6e4c81b68162b3001
FileHash-MD5 2d24044c0a5b9ebe4e01ded2bfc2b3a4
FileHash-MD5 2fe7e75bc599b1c68b87cf2a3e7aa51f
FileHash-MD5 31b01387ca60a1771349653a3c6ad8ca
FileHash-MD5 36dd0fbd19899f0b23ade5a1de3c2fec
FileHash-MD5 389bc3b9417d893f3324221141edea00
FileHash-MD5 389f6e6fd9dcc84c6e944dc387087a56
FileHash-MD5 3a54acd967dd104522ba7d66f4d86544
FileHash-MD5 3f12bf4a8d82654861b5b5993c012bfa
FileHash-MD5 49f8ed13a8a13799a34cc999b195bf16
FileHash-MD5 4b96dc735b622a94d3c74c0be9858853
FileHash-MD5 6fcee9878216019c8dfa887075c5e68e
FileHash-MD5 88be01f8c4a9f335d33fa7c384ca4666
FileHash-MD5 9d3557cc5c444fe5d73e4c7fe1872414
FileHash-MD5 a30319545fda9e2da0532746c09130eb
FileHash-MD5 aa8da99d5623fafed356a14e59acbb90
FileHash-MD5 cba05e11cb9d1d71f0fa70ecd1af2480
FileHash-MD5 cbfb691e95ee34a324f94ed1ff91bc23
FileHash-MD5 d445d443ace329fb244edc3e5146313b
FileHash-MD5 f3f28018fb5108b516d802a038f90bde
FileHash-MD5 f45008bf1889a8655d32a0eb93b8acdd
domain content-protect.net
domain control-issue.net
domain gosportal.net
domain mirconnect.info
domain net-plugin.org
domain office-confirm.com
domain riamir.net
domain sber-cloud.info
domain triger-working.com
domain web-privacy.net
domain web-wathapp.com
domain yandesks.net
domain yandesktop.com
domain yandisk.info
hostname kim.nl.tab.digital
hostname webdav.mydrive.ch
Unveiling WolfsBane: Linux counterpart to Gelsevirine ESET researchers have discovered previously unknown Linux backdoors attributed to the China-aligned Gelsemium APT group. The main backdoor, named WolfsBane, is the Linux equivalent of Gelsemium's Gelsevirine backdoor for Windows. Another backdoor, FireWood, is connected to the group's Project Wood malware. These tools are designed for cyberespionage, targeting system information, credentials, and specific files. The malware uses sophisticated techniques for persistence, stealth, and command execution. This discovery marks Gelsemium's first known use of Linux malware, indicating a shift in APT tactics towards exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing Linux systems.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 0ff2f7ef56717a032d970ff8b78c85e4
FileHash-MD5 17ffeda7cf0f19381fb1eb0e70c03927
FileHash-MD5 1b6868f8c412e1e6efc4d7149173c5a9
FileHash-MD5 2251bc7910fe46fd0baf8bc05599bdcf
FileHash-MD5 24fff48947a8f5a100e21d5592f92d4c
FileHash-MD5 3230cb323663710d52dfe18b9f0cb369
FileHash-MD5 35b4867b323749cc72406f471b149efc
FileHash-MD5 35e941f5df1560f0c2191c23e5189ada
FileHash-MD5 4b51d56955a4438481f8452120a36aa0
FileHash-MD5 5480f12015b0520b7e33519725bec6ef
FileHash-MD5 5789e8b1a31d7117b05143cec4a85378
FileHash-MD5 5d7cd888012605ddeab265865b7ba994
FileHash-MD5 61d5bc51f97b9df015dea3990cfef29b
FileHash-MD5 66920df486acdd7aaa48baf6a5b753d5
FileHash-MD5 6d9957965ead9b7b9d7f896de59f8c1b
FileHash-MD5 77bb729852a957efc606c64180543ea9
FileHash-MD5 8545af9eb02ab26574df2834bcf1a5a5
FileHash-MD5 87e437cf74ce4b1330b8af9ff71edae2
FileHash-MD5 87eb0975758ecef44e8368914cffe151
FileHash-MD5 97d46525797ffa7530851481eb96dd47
FileHash-MD5 9ca6d9526a1c9fb2e624c382f687a92d
FileHash-MD5 9cacec575782d7b25a94f10e2061ac4c
FileHash-MD5 bc4d2f84a6ce49f06a6be32ccfaa1630
FileHash-MD5 c857b9f9b8bd330e160cc3a3c274b068
FileHash-MD5 cd5da0b66319efbe346a4ac98df2f6d0
FileHash-MD5 d1a505f2a335a8aa05d3b74358157ff3
FileHash-SHA1 029407c923c279803c6d7cbc7673936bca2e580c
FileHash-SHA1 0471e1a214f458d4c478677ec9896b0f31207377
FileHash-SHA1 055f1e13e0fea44dc42e8cd8c9219ed588360304
FileHash-SHA1 0ab53321bb9699d354a032259423175c08fec1a4
FileHash-SHA1 0cedfb1789ef139b6040cf8d84ba130360c4eb7d
FileHash-SHA1 0fef89711da11c550d3914debc0e663f5d2fb86c
FileHash-SHA1 1042c798d7ff69eb52cbeae684c74fc0ee84aacd
FileHash-SHA1 1dd4e8119efb34beaec6af55b66222d3dc5036eb
FileHash-SHA1 209c4994a42af7832f526e09238fb55d5aab34e5
FileHash-SHA1 21c9b87a8cf75deba6cff8cf66aa015d6fb46be2
FileHash-SHA1 225fa75d48c7699c3961db1904993e39ae051940
FileHash-SHA1 238c8e8eb7a732d85d8a7f7ca40b261d8ae4183d
FileHash-SHA1 239db66faa803772f2a8905b1e77377a5bf78351
FileHash-SHA1 2668050fcad373fcd548792d9793375e4d704bef
FileHash-SHA1 2b03ffe35090ce5f9341e046464c9eed8a64441d
FileHash-SHA1 2d6ceaf73ea7f70135d9a82a397625c89c408f05
FileHash-SHA1 2f795d69641312b6653b59c2653d7bf368a4405f
FileHash-SHA1 366a9e646a167fcd2381bc15905f7d7a5e76a100
FileHash-SHA1 36e46ad4a9f31634d32b26bdba618df5ecdca188
FileHash-SHA1 374c38e11c50f5eddd8f3708c557529a62446a4e
FileHash-SHA1 39d7bbf6b95fa8bf37fe434dc6efe380bbf9ab23
FileHash-SHA1 43d27a9c57d252999259aafee9760bda00d1207d
FileHash-SHA1 43eec66f6d68f286357004dc62d6da01991a2eb8
FileHash-SHA1 44947903b2bc760ac2e736b25574be33bf7af40b
FileHash-SHA1 47e0bc09b9b092bf5de415e663bd848917ea8303
FileHash-SHA1 4a932622a1a5259e9c97ebfa8dc11fa84dffe039
FileHash-SHA1 544717ef96a59135cd0a93886c273e3ffe702c1a
FileHash-SHA1 5eacce21513d29a6f318b338d3ee39cc2752f72b
FileHash-SHA1 600c59733444bc8a5f71d41365368f3002465b10
FileHash-SHA1 625e0d33966e4060d57c1daca5eb6d1a51bba3c3
FileHash-SHA1 6ae33a9df4e7d5d19c67edc1d1b73c1674ff5fc1
FileHash-SHA1 6edbf71680f11681eea34be293f5c580de2e16e0
FileHash-SHA1 6f22c761898a3db9a3788967d90a77331dfa66b3
FileHash-SHA1 6f23354186659cd2a02a5521b39f6246199d83af
FileHash-SHA1 6f43fe80806a3fe5c866c0b63cc5b105a85d0e75
FileHash-SHA1 72db8d1e3472150c1be93b68f53f091aacc2234d
FileHash-SHA1 762f73329ff2ebe2b8f55205f886cb5f1de99483
FileHash-SHA1 78102e569c4f40d011d941bdd8fcaab508edacd6
FileHash-SHA1 796ebb4074dde56fc1edefed0628db68b0857e8a
FileHash-SHA1 7b79c0c0e6d9d1760005416a463beea4518b822c
FileHash-SHA1 7e5bf24946c77a96532da6fd09eaa1ec4e6f1a91
FileHash-SHA1 8090d015d6770e6826f3a9266dd3b0998d30ddc3
FileHash-SHA1 843d6b0054d066845628e2d5db95201b20e12cd2
FileHash-SHA1 8532eca04c0f58172d80d8a446ae33907d509377
FileHash-SHA1 85528eac10090ae743bcf102b4ae7007b6468255
FileHash-SHA1 88e4679e9a47a51bd82dc22460b5a69fd7d12acc
FileHash-SHA1 8ab3acc8a3f89e5b8e7a1929149d273eddadae64
FileHash-SHA1 8bf0cab4a700bed3e5d7d38c8868d4f388df9a54
FileHash-SHA1 988a70df8a39034ce817d6b968e48103d824a426
FileHash-SHA1 9a2daf6cf400408f1714ef9ba659f7491bdab612
FileHash-SHA1 9c99eb944db0797682d54a57e2782956223e9bd8
FileHash-SHA1 9f7790524bd759373ab57ee2aafa6f5d8bcb918a
FileHash-SHA1 a20c5bf7a30f597524a74d78dfe7ef6f15edad52
FileHash-SHA1 a80c7010fea9915a0a82108139aec3aa2363f0df
FileHash-SHA1 b2a14e77c96640914399e5f46e1dec279e7b940f
FileHash-SHA1 b3dfb40336c2f17ec74051844ffaf65ddb874cfc
FileHash-SHA1 b663c7381f53c2fa6d4619a5fe7d63d3fd7a3455
FileHash-SHA1 bca97bf7e93309e49311701b22569395b2baecc7
FileHash-SHA1 bed9efb245fac8cfff8333ae37ad78ccfb7e2198
FileHash-SHA1 c64435ccd604e142c6498417d66b4950c7c6b670
FileHash-SHA1 ca25fb923f8a8f0293e52893979b7e429e913d7b
FileHash-SHA1 cdbbb6617d8937d17a1a9ef12750bee1cddf4562
FileHash-SHA1 cf4210f762798486cc9d4911d2d9f0f6b2bdf687
FileHash-SHA1 dcb4d0a47ea40fe4420b14552082e03e0e5fda9d
FileHash-SHA1 eca6363825c079099f3729097c06808ac32d4547
FileHash-SHA1 f04feb22efaa8f401470fa5808adab9b35e87c4c
FileHash-SHA1 f1df0c5a74c9885cb5934e3eee5e7d3cf4d291c0
FileHash-SHA1 f43d4d46bae9ad963c2eb05ef43e90aa3a5d88e3
FileHash-SHA1 fd601a54bc622c041df0242662964a7ed31c6b9c
FileHash-SHA256 00b701e3ef29912c1fcd8c2154c4ae372cfe542cfa54ffcce9fb449883097cec
FileHash-SHA256 109d4b8878b8c8f3b7015f6b3ae573a6799296becce0f32ca3bd216bee0ab473
FileHash-SHA256 1a9d78e5c255de239fb18b2cf47c4c2298f047073299c27fb54a0edf08a1d5a1
FileHash-SHA256 1b6bb9e9612982f9cb55a1c88ae988d362d03fd57748d10b8cbe7acd724055c9
FileHash-SHA256 1ec286f2194199206e4ce345f1bf322b6b0b4c947b1cf32db59cca2d89370738
FileHash-SHA256 1f6de1af513f60572799a0893818e1b694c3ec3ff5dabddc8a0f0aa0d96d15d2
FileHash-SHA256 29e78ca3cb49dd2985a29e74cafb1a0a15515670da0f4881f6095fb2926bfefd
FileHash-SHA256 2bab6b951ea0ae3ea9452fd503bacafb45b6687d6352f5415d14810f9cf7a89e
FileHash-SHA256 31d5e55f21246f97da006ddba6306b357d2823c90754a920c7bd268af0d2a1e4
FileHash-SHA256 46338cae732ee1664aac77d9dce57c4ff8666460c1a51bee49cae44c86e42df9
FileHash-SHA256 5299fe79a66b407555cdab68806564ae988b745be589767b004f7bccd7f7ac3b
FileHash-SHA256 552388d74478a84b8e64e3ee2316331740a0d060f322e92b5c608ea745adba90
FileHash-SHA256 5d12c085b600ea2ea42d09e2104ac40d8ba2b6d005db06e12c16016200a92bd8
FileHash-SHA256 6005ecce702b84de6d46838839b2271df631ab42325b70e27324e6cabda76e7f
FileHash-SHA256 6eaeca0cf28e74de6cfd82d29a3c3cc30c2bc153ac811692cc41ee290d766474
FileHash-SHA256 7795a7f3bd08cb62ec6f828ad1f6836114b3e8cf153d905e3f03d6199f1f8354
FileHash-SHA256 93c29bf19e09ea3b1e4ac5d31f47024a544738671488ff7ab2cd8f9a9c302262
FileHash-SHA256 97982e098a4538d05e78c172c9bbc5b412754df86dc73e760004f0038ec928fb
FileHash-SHA256 ae1b66e35a4e1ab8870837a52f3e4acda9e722b3f835d238acb472be49e915d6
FileHash-SHA256 c26d239f415bec27125862acafdeac267be398bc9208e27f09217dc8ecf64225
FileHash-SHA256 cff20753e36a4c942dc4dab5a91fd621a42330e17a89185a5b7262280bcd9263
FileHash-SHA256 d986207bc108e55f4b110ae208656b415d2c5fcc8f99f98b4b3985e82b9d5e5b
FileHash-SHA256 ec491de0e2247f64b753c4ef0c7227ea3548c2f222b547528dae0cf138eca53a
FileHash-SHA256 f0d23aa026ae6ba96051401dc2b390ba5c968d55c2a4b31a36e45fb67dfc2e3c
FileHash-SHA256 fddec9ff14ebd957038f9c24843bff935c4f73651e9704b553dec116851f7ae5
FileHash-SHA256 fe71b66d65d5ff9d03a47197c99081d9ec8d5f6e95143bdc33f5ea2ac0ae5762
domain 4vw37z.cn
domain asidomain.com
domain dsdsei.com
hostname acro.ns1.name
hostname domain.dns04.com
hostname info.96html.com
hostname microsoftservice.dns1.us
hostname pctftp.otzo.com
hostname sitesafecdn.hopto.org
hostname traveltime.hopto.org
hostname www.sitesafecdn.dynamic-dns.net
hostname www.travel.dns04.com
FileHash-MD5 5ebd4452848879202414a46a09cd2eab
FileHash-SHA1 ed5342d9788392c6e854aaefa655c4d3b4831b6b
FileHash-SHA256 a67ac84f61b34b59827cef79b11709d137cc9490d6027e16279793b9b3e894c4
hostname rootkit.agent.ec
Christmas "Gift" Delivered Through SSH A malicious file named "christmas_slab.pdf.lnk" was discovered, utilizing Windows' built-in SSH support to deliver malware. The LNK file executes ssh.exe to transfer and run a PE file from a remote server. The attack leverages the SSH/SCP protocol, taking advantage of its widespread availability on modern Windows systems. The malicious payload is downloaded from an IP address belonging to Apple's range, raising suspicions. The LNK file's command line arguments reveal the attacker's intent to bypass host key checking and execute the downloaded malware. This technique demonstrates how threat actors are adapting to use legitimate system tools for malicious purposes.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 5e86eb5528e8357fbfa8744f239483ca
FileHash-SHA1 d7c7beb8d38fbc65af3e3fa782ad688dd60bd8ef
FileHash-SHA256 8bd210b33340ee5cdd9031370eed472fcc7cae566752e39408f699644daf8494
Rspack npm Packages Compromised with Crypto Mining Malware in Supply Chain Attack Two npm packages, @rspack/core and @rspack/cli, were compromised in a supply chain attack, allowing the publication of malicious versions containing cryptocurrency mining malware. The attack targeted specific countries and aimed to execute XMRig cryptocurrency miner on Linux hosts. The malicious versions have been unpublished, and version 1.1.8 is now considered safe. The incident highlights the need for stricter safeguards in package managers to protect developers. The Rspack project maintainers have taken steps to secure their infrastructure, including invalidating tokens and auditing source code. An investigation into the root cause of the token theft is ongoing.
Type Indicator
IPv4 80.78.28.72
BellaCPP: Discovering a new BellaCiao variant written in C++ A new C++ variant of the BellaCiao malware, dubbed BellaCPP, has been discovered by researchers. This variant shares similarities with the original .NET-based BellaCiao, including domain generation and SSH tunneling capabilities. BellaCPP was found on a machine also infected with a .NET BellaCiao sample. The malware is designed to run as a Windows service and uses XOR encryption to decrypt strings. It generates domains and checks DNS records to establish communication. The discovery highlights the importance of thorough network investigations, as attackers may deploy unknown samples to maintain persistence. The malware is attributed to the Charming Kitten threat actor with medium-to-high confidence based on similarities in functionality and infrastructure.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 103ce1c5e3fdb122351868949a4ebc77
FileHash-MD5 14f6c034af7322156e62a6c961106a8c
FileHash-MD5 222380fa5a0c1087559abbb6d1a5f889
FileHash-MD5 28d02ea14757fe69214a97e5b6386e95
FileHash-MD5 36b97c500e36d5300821e874452bbcb2
FileHash-MD5 44d8b88c539808bb9a479f98393cf3c7
FileHash-MD5 4c6aa8750dc426f2c676b23b39710903
FileHash-MD5 8ecd457c1ddfbb58afea3e39da2bf17b
FileHash-MD5 ac4606a0e10067b00c510fb97b5bd2cc
FileHash-MD5 ac6ddd56aa4bf53170807234bc91345a
FileHash-MD5 e24b07e2955eb3e98de8b775db00dc68
FileHash-MD5 febf2a94bc59011b09568071c52512b5
FileHash-SHA1 dccdfc77dd2803b3c5a97af0851efa0aa5bbeeeb
FileHash-SHA256 e4e3f09c4257269cef6cfbebc83c8a60376ce5e547080502e3e408a3f9916218
domain systemupdate.info
Now You See Me, Now You Don't: Using LLMs to Obfuscate Malicious JavaScript This article discusses an adversarial machine learning algorithm that uses large language models (LLMs) to generate novel variants of malicious JavaScript code at scale. The algorithm iteratively transforms malicious code to evade detection while maintaining its functionality. The process involves rewriting prompts such as variable renaming, dead code insertion, and whitespace removal. The technique significantly reduced detection rates on VirusTotal. To counter this, the researchers retrained their classifier on LLM-rewritten samples, improving real-world detection by 10%. The study highlights both the potential threats and opportunities presented by LLMs in cybersecurity, demonstrating how they can be used to create evasive malware variants but also to enhance defensive capabilities.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA256 03d3e9c54028780d2ff15c654d7a7e70973453d2fae8bdeebf5d9dbb10ff2eab
FileHash-SHA256 3f0b95f96a8f28631eb9ce6d0f40b47220b44f4892e171ede78ba78bd9e293ef
FileHash-SHA256 4f1eb707f863265403152a7159f805b5557131c568353b48c013cad9ffb5ae5f
URL http://jakang.freewebhostmost.com/korea/app.html
hostname bafkreihpvn2wkpofobf4ctonbmzty24fr73fzf4jbyiydn3qvke55kywdi.ipfs.dweb.link
Recent Cases of Watering Hole Attacks, Part 1 This analysis focuses on a watering hole attack targeting a Japanese university research laboratory website in 2023. The attack used social engineering to trick users into downloading and executing malware disguised as an Adobe Flash Player update. The malware, identified as a modified Cobalt Strike Beacon, was injected into the Explorer process. The attackers used Cloudflare Workers for their C2 server and employed various techniques to evade detection, including disabling anti-analysis functions and stopping antivirus software. The report also mentions other attacks by the same group, using decoy documents and malware with specific execution options. The article emphasizes the importance of maintaining awareness of diverse attack vectors beyond commonly exploited vulnerabilities in exposed assets.
Type Indicator
CVE CVE-2022-1388
FileHash-SHA256 284431674a187a4f5696c228ce8575cbd40a3dc21ac905083e813d7ba0eb2f08
FileHash-SHA256 3bf1e683e0b6050292d13be44812aafa2aa42fdb9840fb8c1a0e4424d4a11e21
FileHash-SHA256 791c28f482358c952ff860805eaefc11fd57d0bf21ec7df1b9781c7e7d995ba3
FileHash-SHA256 7b334fce8e3119c2807c63fcc7c7dc862534f38bb063b44fef557c02a10fdda1
FileHash-SHA256 a0224574ed356282a7f0f2cac316a7a888d432117e37390339b73ba518ba5d88
FileHash-SHA256 df0ba6420142fc09579002e461b60224dd7d6d159b0f759c66ea432b1430186d
FileHash-SHA256 f8ba95995d772f8c4c0ffcffc710499c4d354204da5fa553fd33cf1c5f0f6edb
URL http://cdn.nifttymail.com/
hostname cdn.nifttymail.com
hostname www.mcasprod.com
Cyberattack: UAC-0125 using the theme "Army+" (CERT-UA#12559) A cyber attack attributed to UAC-0125 has been identified, involving websites mimicking the official 'Army+' app page. These sites, hosted on Cloudflare Workers, prompt users to download a malicious executable. The EXE file, an NSIS installer, contains a decoy .NET file, Python interpreter, Tor files, and a PowerShell script. When executed, it installs an OpenSSH server, generates RSA keys, and sets up remote hidden access to the victim's computer via Tor. This activity is associated with UAC-0002 (APT44/Sandworm). Previous incidents in early 2024 used trojanized Microsoft Office packages as the initial compromise vector. The attackers may further expand their attack on the organization's IT infrastructure if successful.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 0799756f104a70cb6ce0cfc422de25db
FileHash-MD5 08a0c1166d8e50d95254b198b8168726
FileHash-MD5 4316eb790d186ffda2999257f8ded747
FileHash-MD5 52853b39922251a4166a5b032e577e7a
FileHash-MD5 79782773ffee7b8141674c27e9bfc109
FileHash-MD5 a27a90a685dad9fc7f1c5962f278f197
FileHash-MD5 a2f355057ade20d32afc5c4192ce3986
FileHash-MD5 ed0c7c1925ac23bd8b4d09e77aabb0ee
FileHash-SHA1 102f9a4c97669da4f564b4d8f78bf0def7ab3a51
FileHash-SHA1 ccec79b6300f8e86c3beff86bac01362f71e7715
FileHash-SHA256 4dca04f1e16cbe88776a3187031cff64981155cb3b992031250c6fed40496318
FileHash-SHA256 86039bc8b1a6bb823f5cbf27d1a4a3b319b83d242f09ffcd96f38bbdbbaaa78f
FileHash-SHA256 8ba4c3ede1ed05a3ad7075fee503215648ec078a13523492e2e91a59fa40c8da
FileHash-SHA256 b663e08cc267cdb7a02d5131cb04b8b05cb6ad13ac1d571c6aafe69e06bf8f80
FileHash-SHA256 d2049157980b7ee0a54948d4def4ab62303ca51cadaada06fb51c583ecbce1a2
domain wvtmsouaa2gt6jmcuxj5hkfrqdss5lhecoqijt5dl7gfruueu3i5mkad.onion
cShell DDoS Bot Attack Case Targeting Linux SSH Server (screen and hping3) A new DDoS malware strain named cShell is targeting poorly managed Linux servers through SSH services. The threat actor uses brute force attacks to gain initial access, then installs the cShell bot developed in Go language. cShell exploits Linux tools 'screen' and 'hping3' to perform various DDoS attacks. It supports multiple DDoS commands, including SYN, ACK, and UDP floods. The malware maintains persistence by registering as a service and can update itself using Pastebin URLs. cShell's simple design leverages existing Linux tools, making it an effective DDoS bot. To protect against such attacks, administrators should use strong passwords, regularly update systems, and implement security measures like firewalls.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 29d6ef7365c18d243163a648fa6cd697
FileHash-MD5 cd8bf4ce178ef5ddac77933d03ffb381
FileHash-SHA1 b5ec51ae8d64810119ac8f1f2ae84448af31c5a7
FileHash-SHA256 781b4790834757804bd0e80ce5d8180155cac6fc8952cd03d8f824ccba376058
Welcome to the party, pal! This end-of-year newsletter discusses cybersecurity trends and personal anecdotes. It emphasizes the importance of multi-factor authentication and password management, highlighting the prevalence of identity-based attacks. The author shares a story about introducing hardware tokens to family members, which was met with limited enthusiasm. The newsletter also mentions Cisco Talos' vulnerability research efforts, recent security headlines, and upcoming events. It concludes with a list of prevalent malware files detected by Talos telemetry.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f
FileHash-MD5 71fea034b422e4a17ebb06022532fdde
FileHash-MD5 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376
FileHash-MD5 d86808f6e519b5ce79b83b99dfb9294d
FileHash-MD5 ff1b6bb151cf9f671c929a4cbdb64d86
FileHash-SHA1 105a1c3972fcfd3d0609d3384ea5dbf239a3f52d
FileHash-SHA1 61c39b571c368ca1f37c82f27c010e86f622a62d
FileHash-SHA1 6961bb05459f43c3bb9374cdfc515226a17a017c
FileHash-SHA1 bcfac98117d9a52a3196a7bd041b49d5ff0cfb8c
FileHash-SHA1 e10361a11f8a7f232ac3cb2125c1875a0a69a3e4
FileHash-SHA256 47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca
FileHash-SHA256 7b3ec2365a64d9a9b2452c22e82e6d6ce2bb6dbc06c6720951c9570a5cd46fe5
FileHash-SHA256 873ee789a177e59e7f82d3030896b1efdebe468c2dfa02e41ef94978aadf006f
FileHash-SHA256 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507
FileHash-SHA256 a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91
Araneida Scanner: Cracked Acunetix Web App & API Scanner Discovered Silent Push Threat Analysts have uncovered the Araneida Scanner, a cracked version of Acunetix being used for illegal purposes. The scanner is employed for offensive reconnaissance, user data scraping, and vulnerability exploitation. It was detected during a partner's reconnaissance effort, prompting an investigation. The tool is being promoted on Telegram, where actors boast about taking over thousands of websites and selling stolen credentials. A separate Chinese-language panel, also likely using cracked Acunetix software, was discovered. Both tools pose significant threats for reconnaissance prior to sophisticated attacks. The investigation revealed multiple IP addresses hosting Araneida customer panels and the continued sale of the scanner through a specific domain.
Type Indicator
IPv4 23.26.77.145
IPv4 163.5.210.49
IPv4 157.254.237.94
IPv4 163.5.169.250
IPv4 163.5.169.45
IPv4 163.5.32.179
IPv4 163.5.32.202
IPv4 163.5.32.203
IPv4 163.5.32.204
IPv4 163.5.32.72
IPv4 205.234.181.204
domain araneida.co
domain fofa.su
Threat Actors Hijack Misconfigured Servers for Live Sports Streaming Aqua Nautilus researchers uncovered a new attack vector where threat actors exploit misconfigured JupyterLab and Jupyter Notebook applications to hijack servers for streaming sports events. The attackers gain unauthenticated access, install ffmpeg, and use it to capture live streams, redirecting them to illegal servers. This activity, while seemingly minor, poses significant risks including data manipulation, theft, and potential financial damage. The researchers used Aqua Tracee and TraceeShark tools to analyze the attack, revealing the process of server compromise and stream ripping. The campaign primarily targeted Qatari beIN Sports network broadcasts, with evidence suggesting the attackers may be of Arab-speaking origin. The attack demonstrates the importance of securing data science environments and highlights the growing threat of illegal sports streaming to the entertainment industry.
Type Indicator
domain x9pro.xyz
One Sock Fits All: The use and abuse of the NSOCKS botnet The ngioweb botnet serves as the foundation for the NSOCKS criminal proxy service, maintaining over 35,000 bots daily across 180 countries. The botnet primarily targets SOHO routers and IoT devices, with two-thirds of proxies based in the U.S. NSOCKS utilizes over 180 'backconnect' C2 nodes to obscure users' identities. The infrastructure enables various threat actors to create their own services and launch DDoS attacks. The botnet employs multiple exploits, targeting vulnerable devices and evading common security solutions. NSOCKS is notorious among criminal forums and has been used by groups like Muddled Libra. The service allows users to purchase proxies with cryptocurrency, offering features such as domain filtering for targeted use. The open nature of NSOCKS has led to its abuse by other actors, including DDoS attackers and other proxy services like Shopsocks5 and VN5Socks.
Type Indicator
domain antigutation.info
domain antihicipate.com
domain dnslookips.com
domain emelenalike.com
domain inofokable.net
domain interocakate.com
domain minixetepate.biz
domain overedaxive-nonameraness.net
domain overuvezor.com
domain promexucate.com
domain subonuker.name
domain ultradomafy.net
domain underuvukent.com
FileHash-MD5 9998be16901e7f80aad8d931305e057e
Attackers exploiting a FortiClient EMS vulnerability in the wild Kaspersky's GERT team identified an attack exploiting a patched vulnerability (CVE-2023-48788) in FortiClient EMS versions 7.0.1 to 7.0.10 and 7.2.0 to 7.2.2. The attackers used SQL injection to infiltrate a company's network through an exposed Windows server. They deployed remote access tools like ScreenConnect and AnyDesk, performed network enumeration, credential theft, and defense evasion. The vulnerability allows unauthorized code execution via specially crafted data packets. Multiple threat actors have been observed exploiting this vulnerability globally, targeting various companies and consistently altering ScreenConnect subdomains. The analysis highlights the importance of timely patching and implementing additional security controls to prevent such attacks.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 0f73b467ff03f9224c024f4eb3aecedb
FileHash-MD5 29efd64dd3c7fe1e2b022b7ad73a1ba5
FileHash-MD5 52746d457f8ec149fd13dea85b654b19
FileHash-MD5 ca564428a29faf1a613f35d9fa36313f
FileHash-MD5 f3d20449bab41301aefad304cb02773b
FileHash-MD5 f6efd0e3b1d30954b1f67bef372bef79
FileHash-MD5 fae1061813f2148296767d28262d2c25
FileHash-SHA1 34162aaf41c08f0de2f888728b7f4dc2a43b50ec
FileHash-SHA1 441a52f0112da187244eeec5b24a79f40cc17d47
FileHash-SHA1 44b83dd83d189f19e54700a288035be8aa7c8672
FileHash-SHA1 59e1322440b4601d614277fe9092902b6ca471c2
FileHash-SHA1 73f8e5c17b49b9f2703fed59cc2be77239e904f7
FileHash-SHA1 746710470586076bb0757e0b3875de9c90202be2
FileHash-SHA1 75ebd5bab5e2707d4533579a34d983b65af5ec7f
FileHash-SHA1 83cff3719c7799a3e27a567042e861106f33bb19
FileHash-SHA1 841fff3a36d82c14b044da26967eb2a8f61175a8
FileHash-SHA1 8834f7ab3d4aa5fb14d851c7790e1a6812ea4ca8
FileHash-SHA1 8cfd968741a7c8ec2dcbe0f5333674025e6be1dc
FileHash-SHA1 bc29888042d03fe0ffb57fc116585e992a4fdb9b
FileHash-SHA1 cf1ca6c7f818e72454c923fea7824a8f6930cb08
FileHash-SHA1 e3b6ea8c46fa831cec6f235a5cf48b38a4ae8d69
FileHash-SHA256 3bb8445c95142da1bda0e3440b53cc70e05a3fe996a77e6dcfb2919fd8878ca9
FileHash-SHA256 61c0810a23580cf492a6ba4f7654566108331e7a4134c968c2d6a05261b2d8a1
FileHash-SHA256 99839c78ee69f81fe0a92d3fea01eb50d7bd47cbaf90fdb64bda9bcfbe29955a
FileHash-SHA256 c41216eee9756a1dcc546df4fe97defc05513eed64ce6ac05f1501b50e6f96cc
FileHash-SHA256 c7d994eb2042633172bd8866c9f163be531444ce3126d5f340edd25cbdb473d4
FileHash-SHA256 e705f69afd97f343f3c1f2bc6027d30935a0bfd29ff025c563f6f8c1f9a7478e
FileHash-SHA256 ee4dc882b4b8a9850938b33811deda219fac8764fcb9d09b6f697cee598eb7c0
IPv4 185.196.9.31
IPv4 206.206.77.33
IPv4 24.1.92.155
IPv4 45.141.84.45
IPv4 5.61.59.201
IPv4 87.120.125.55
hostname qvmlaztyjogwgkikmknv2ch3t5yhb6vw4.oast.fun
hostname www.lidahtoto2.com
Security Brief: Threat Actors Gift Holiday Lures to Threat Landscape As the holiday season approaches, threat actors are exploiting people's desires for deals, jobs, and end-of-year bonuses. Researchers have observed an increase in themed content delivering malware, fraud, and credential phishing campaigns. Examples include a 'Winter Holiday Promotion' campaign delivering Remcos RAT, credential phishing campaigns impersonating HR departments to steal login information, and employment fraud schemes targeting universities. These attacks use timely lures such as holiday promotions, bonus announcements, and seasonal job offers to manipulate victims into risky online behaviors. The campaigns employ various techniques, including compressed executables, QR codes, and specially crafted OOXML files to bypass detection and harvest user credentials.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA256 713d2cca841c2d3df5ba1a4f8926970966ff931d01616ac48d5170a69c1e0765
IPv4 185.161.251.208
domain jobs-projecthope.org
domain orients-pk.com
domain quantumdhub.ru
Python-Based NodeStealer Version Targets Facebook Ads Manager The latest variant of NodeStealer has evolved from JavaScript to Python, expanding its data theft capabilities. Trend Micro's MXDR team uncovered this advanced version in a campaign targeting a Malaysian educational institution, linked to a Vietnamese threat group. The malware now targets Facebook Ads Manager accounts, stealing critical financial and business information alongside credit card details and browser data. The infection begins with a spear-phishing email containing a malicious link, which downloads and installs the malware disguised as a legitimate application. Sophisticated techniques like DLL sideloading and encoded PowerShell commands are used to bypass security and execute the final payload, exfiltrating data via Telegram.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA256 1c9c7bb07acb9d612af2007cb633a6b1f569b197b1f93abc9bd3af8593e1ec66
FileHash-SHA256 786db3ddf2a471516c832e44b0d9a230674630c6f99d3e61ada6830726172458
FileHash-SHA256 ed1c48542a3e58020bd624c592f6aa7f7868ee16fbb03308269d44c4108011b1
FileHash-SHA256 f813da93eed9c536154a6da5f38462bfb4ed80c85dd117c3fd681cf4790fbf71
Effective Phishing Campaign Targeting European Companies and Institutions A sophisticated phishing operation targeting European automotive, chemical, and industrial manufacturing companies has been uncovered. The campaign, which peaked in June 2024, used HubSpot Free Form Builder and Docusign-enabled PDFs to harvest account credentials and infiltrate Microsoft Azure cloud infrastructures. Approximately 20,000 users were targeted across various European organizations. The attackers employed multiple redirection techniques, custom user-agent strings, and Bulletproof VPS hosts to evade detection. Once access was gained, the threat actors attempted to maintain persistence by adding new devices to compromised accounts. The campaign highlights the ongoing threat of targeted phishing attacks against corporate cloud infrastructures.
Type Indicator
IPv4 144.217.158.133
IPv4 91.92.245.39
FileHash-MD5 fcaff35c15872a69c6757196acd79173
FileHash-SHA256 b2ca9c6859598255cd92700de1c217a595adb93093a43995c8bb7af94974f067
FileHash-SHA256 deff0a6fbf88428ddef2ee3c4d857697d341c35110e4c1208717d9cce1897a21
FileHash-SHA256 f3f0bf362f7313d87fcfefcd6a80ab0f18bc6c5517d047be186f7b81a979ff91
IPv4 167.114.27.228
IPv4 188.166.3.116
IPv4 208.115.208.118
IPv4 208.91.198.96
IPv4 49.12.110.250
IPv4 91.92.242.68
IPv4 91.92.244.131
IPv4 91.92.253.66
IPv4 94.156.71.208
IPv4 94.46.246.46
URL http://orderconfirmation.dgpropertyconsultants.buzz/
URL https://9qe.daginvusc.com/miUxeH/
URL https://asdrfghjk3wr4e5yr6uyjhgb.mhp-hotels.buzz/?Nhv3zM=xI7Kyf
URL https://docs.doc2rprevn.buzz/?username=
URL https://docs.doc2rprevn.buzz?username=
URL https://docusharepoint.fundament-advisory.buzz/?3aGw=Nl9
URL https://espersonal.org/doc0024/index.php?submissionGuid=6e59d483-9dc2-48f8-ad5a-c2d2ec8f4569
URL https://espersonal.org/doc0024/index.php?submissionGuid=96a9b82a-55d3-402d-9af4-c2c5361daf5c
URL https://orderconfirmating.symmetric.buzz/?df=ZUvkMN&submissionGuid=e06a1f83-c24e-4106-b415-d2f43a06a048
URL https://orderspecification.tekfenconstruction.buzz/?6BI=AmaPH&submissionGuid=e2ce33ea-ee47-4829-882c-592217dea521
URL https://purchaseorder.europeanfreightleaders.buzz/?Mt=zqoE&submissionGuid=476f32d0-e667-4a18-830b-f57a2b401fc3
URL https://purchaseorder.vermeernigeria.buzz/?cKg=C3&submissionGuid=4631b0c9-5e10-4d81-b1d6-4d01045907e7
URL https://technicaldevelopment.industrialization.buzz/?o0B=RLNT
URL https://technicaldevelopment.rljaccommodationstrust.buzz/?WKg=2Ljv8
URL https://vigaspino.com/2doc5/index.php?submissionGuid=093410a5-c228-4ddf-890c-861cdc6fe5d8
URL https://vigaspino.com/2doc5/index.php?submissionGuid=1d51a08d-cf55-4146-8b5b-22caa765ac85
URL https://vomc.qeanonsop.xyz/?hh5=IY&username=ian@deloitte.es
URL https://wr43wer3ee.cyptech.com.au/oeeo4/ewi9ew/mnph_term=?/&submissionGuid=50aa078a-fb48-4fec-86df-29f40a680602
domain espersonal.org
domain vigaspino.com
hostname 9qe.daginvusc.com
hostname asdrfghjk3wr4e5yr6uyjhgb.mhp-hotels.buzz
hostname docs.doc2rprevn.buzz
hostname docusharepoint.fundament-advisory.buzz
hostname orderconfirmating.symmetric.buzz
hostname orderconfirmation.dgpropertyconsultants.buzz
hostname orderspecification.tekfenconstruction.buzz
hostname purchaseorder.europeanfreightleaders.buzz
hostname purchaseorder.vermeernigeria.buzz
hostname technicaldevelopment.industrialization.buzz
hostname technicaldevelopment.rljaccommodationstrust.buzz
hostname vomc.qeanonsop.xyz
hostname wr43wer3ee.cyptech.com.au
hostname www.acmeinc.buzz
Your Data Is Under New Management: The Rise of LummaStealer LummaStealer, a relatively new information-stealing malware, has gained prominence since 2022 for its ability to collect sensitive data from Windows systems. Marketed as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on underground forums, it targets individuals, cryptocurrency users, and small to medium-sized businesses. The malware employs various infection vectors, including phishing emails, cracked software, and malicious downloads. It harvests credentials, cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and system information, exfiltrating data to remote servers. Recent campaigns have shown increased sophistication in social engineering tactics and the use of legitimate platforms like Steam and Dropbox to evade detection. The malware's accessibility through MaaS has made it popular among diverse threat actors, complicating attribution efforts.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 3e35a7a3203cc7726ce4e9f7f30806ef
FileHash-MD5 3f58a517f1f4796225137e7659ad2adb
FileHash-MD5 477264c48dbbc071190a6c7fc22cbb9c
FileHash-MD5 4b7f5578a6189b71b5f2d81f30a948f4
FileHash-MD5 870feaab725b148208dd12ffabe33f9d
FileHash-MD5 cbf6c2a14cba45f95569c9d011219518
FileHash-MD5 e74b1e485e42e8ba7a65ab6927e872a5
FileHash-SHA1 128a085b84667420359bfd5b7bad0a431ca89e35
FileHash-SHA1 594d61532fb2aea88f2e3245473b600d351ee398
FileHash-SHA1 99b8464e2aabff3f35899ead95dfac83f5edac51
FileHash-SHA1 9f3651ad5725848c880c24f8e749205a7e1e78c1
FileHash-SHA1 a01fa9facf3a13c5a9c079d79974842abff2a3f2
FileHash-SHA1 afdefcd9eb251202665388635c0109b5f7b4c0a5
FileHash-SHA1 bfc1422d1c5351561087bd3e6d82ffbad5221dae
FileHash-SHA1 c07e49c362f0c21513507726994a9bd040c0d4eb
FileHash-SHA1 e264ba0e9987b0ad0812e5dd4dd3075531cfe269
FileHash-SHA1 f2c37ad5ca8877186c846b6dfb2cb761f5353305
FileHash-SHA1 f89f91e33bf59d0a07dfb1c4d7246d74a05dd67d
FileHash-SHA256 1c2ec4c72c2f31a327b6ba4dfe27a607d311578e25d96cf34c54845eea986f36
FileHash-SHA256 1da298cab4d537b0b7b5dabf09bff6a212b9e45731e0cc772f99026005fb9e48
FileHash-SHA256 2468e5bb596fa4543dba2adfe8fd795073486193b77108319e073b9924709a8a
FileHash-SHA256 3aa011528c4d261a82a0698a5be19d47c4114e2443b93617978fe7f34957930f
FileHash-SHA256 bbf7154f14d736f0c8491fb9fb44d2f179cdb02d34ab54c04466fa0702ea7d55
FileHash-SHA256 c28c1d76b1937373be1b5d5455e2accf3698c41cb3815d01209b232e82b6dae0
IPv4 146.19.128.68
IPv4 89.187.169.3
domain carrtychaintnyw.shop
domain clicktogo.click
domain complainnykso.shop
domain conservaitiwo.shop
domain crowdstrike-office365.com
domain matteryshzh.cfd
domain naggersanimism.shop
domain pardaoboccia.shop
domain proffoduwnuq.shop
domain quotamkdsdqo.shop
domain steppyplantnw.shop
hostname a3.bigdownloadtech.shop
Fake Captcha Driving Infostealer Infections and a Glimpse to the Dark Side of Internet Advertising A large-scale fake captcha campaign has been distributing Lumma info-stealer malware through malvertising techniques. The campaign, relying on a single ad network, delivers over 1 million daily ad impressions, causing thousands of daily victims to lose their accounts and money. The malicious activity is propagated through a network of 3,000+ content sites funneling traffic. The campaign uses deceptive captcha pages that trick users into executing PowerShell commands, instantly installing stealer malware. The ad network Monetag, a subsidiary of PropellerAds, is identified as the primary facilitator. The threat actors leverage services like BeMob for cloaking, showcasing the fragmented accountability in the ad ecosystem. The campaign's success highlights the need for stronger proactive measures in ad networks and the importance of user caution when encountering free content online.
Type Indicator
domain chromeupdates.com
FileHash-MD5 7a0525921ff54f1193db83d7303c6ee8
domain adstrails.com
domain boltsreach.com
domain cdn-downloads-now.xyz
domain fiare-activity.com
domain fingerboarding.com
domain foodrailway.cfd
domain glidronix.com
domain impressflow.com
domain insigelo.com
domain marimarbahamas.me
domain mediamanagerverif.com
domain nettrilo.com
domain nowuseemi.com
domain offerztodayforu.com
domain privatemeld.com
domain restoindia.me
domain satisfiedweb.com
domain secureporter.com
domain servinglane.com
domain sheenglathora.com
domain stephighs.com
domain taketheright.com
domain techstalone.com
domain tracksvista.com
domain travelwithandrew.xyz
domain tunneloid.com
domain westreamdaily.com
domain yourtruelover.com
hostname sos-ch-gva-2.sos-cdn.net
hostname xxxx.bmtrck.com
A new playground: Malicious campaigns proliferate from VSCode to npm This intelligence details the emergence of malicious campaigns spreading from VSCode to npm. Researchers observed an increasing amount of malicious activity in VSCode Marketplace, with threat actors using npm packages to inject malicious code into VSCode IDE. The campaign initially targeted the crypto community but later expanded to impersonate the Zoom application. Malicious extensions contained downloader functionality and were obfuscated with Javascript Obfuscator. The campaign then spread to npm with the package 'etherscancontracthandler'. The analysis highlights the importance of scrutinizing open source, third-party, and commercial code, as well as performing regular security assessments to prevent IDE compromises and protect the software supply chain.
Type Indicator
FileHash-SHA1 025daf1d161f0dc30280359b4ff2731b6458715e
FileHash-SHA1 0289c2bc1c9e10bc053ef25d151793e327a8f714
FileHash-SHA1 0d5710de0832f2c3667536fc3d808642e6593a27
FileHash-SHA1 11d432d5d6d8792900e31371db4380a9ac9eb984
FileHash-SHA1 1f8ead255e26a57e7b6c4b211ace51a7788d5698
FileHash-SHA1 44c5170aba403943fa054432852f3c1a00178311
FileHash-SHA1 5312be1dbfd1b2dd2ba15d05b4e607c4bde533b4
FileHash-SHA1 5390a60adfd8dbf5aef4e132e8565659518ef995
FileHash-SHA1 53c4207325d46bfad2c39111fc6ce79d0274f031
FileHash-SHA1 53f7be3adec90f264592113d9fff98829d8c2fdd
FileHash-SHA1 5ae998a23d7aacd4faf9f42a92bd4d9b2b598ddd
FileHash-SHA1 5e524e3f5b59b2ddd9072d63d60cc324d7bbfee1
FileHash-SHA1 6da24384853e68cc80107f8b87a185b1cd45f93d
FileHash-SHA1 6f2d90229f8d3a20af51fc7d20dbcc02342b3d3e
FileHash-SHA1 8d224808b2f10a40277410efd92246712e827bee
FileHash-SHA1 b1f8c2cce439863b9a4bd0a41c9b356cc93de930
FileHash-SHA1 b9544c0bd0a1da21f2f048673c214795312c636c
FileHash-SHA1 c7f67ff39917a8f22da34fdeb4a0c1915db2ad10
FileHash-SHA1 cdc2389f62f40773fc196f26fbc73d7607ef71d6
FileHash-SHA1 db03d411690a977d24255311379cb52ff4c6fb6f
FileHash-SHA1 e114543341a47477f325098008a099ec688831e4
FileHash-SHA1 e950ead90af29948e1b0b19b4bdf65821648aeeb
FileHash-SHA1 f2c8e3fbaa7c398f8678ab5cfb2c6b2d9124641e
domain captchacdn.com
domain microsoft-visualstudiocode.com
NotLockBit: A Deep Dive Into the New Ransomware Threat NotLockBit is an emerging ransomware family that mimics LockBit's behavior while targeting both macOS and Windows systems. Distributed as an x86_64 golang binary, it showcases advanced capabilities including targeted file encryption, data exfiltration, and self-deletion mechanisms. The malware gathers system information, generates and encrypts a master key, and writes collected data to text files. It utilizes AWS credentials for data exfiltration, encrypts specific file types while avoiding certain directories, and employs AES encryption. NotLockBit alters the desktop wallpaper and performs self-deletion after execution. The analysis reveals variations in obfuscation and compilation techniques across samples, highlighting its sophistication and evolving nature in the ransomware landscape.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 06bd47b8ec7e6277dc6c8842d00f7243
FileHash-MD5 37ec80fbc2302d5893cb6984cb1a43e2
FileHash-MD5 6316694dd1f6fd53bd04e351b86ddf70
FileHash-MD5 6744ed739ba526283864fe4917c91bb3
FileHash-MD5 8b26b29569c5d912d1d46e0de6a84edc
FileHash-SHA1 23f3b070aad47f72ddf2d148f455cce2266901fd
FileHash-SHA1 2e8cadad5ab90651ae36fb09fb386ffd91bd0d41
FileHash-SHA1 367362b4ab6384833752b6936c296f3746859b82
FileHash-SHA1 6c19a41d033ccc39bd42bc2f2e830e1f5808ca15
FileHash-SHA1 c9611cba90349e78b6051c299dc8d012048a91a4
FileHash-SHA256 14fe0071e76b23673569115042a961136ef057848ad44cf35d9f2ca86bd90d31
FileHash-SHA256 2e62c9850f331799f1e4893698295d0b069ab04529a6db1bfc4f193fe6aded2c
FileHash-SHA256 a28af0684456c26da769a2e0d29c5a726e86388901370ddf15bd3b355597d564
FileHash-SHA256 aca17ec46730f5677d0d0a995b65504e97dce65da699fac1765db1933c97c7ec
FileHash-SHA256 e02b3309c0b6a774a4d940369633e395b4c374dc3e6aaa64410cc33b0dcd67ac
North Korean group targets nuclear-related organization with new malware The Lazarus group has evolved its infection chain by targeting employees of a nuclear-related organization with a combination of new and old malware. The attack involved delivering malicious archive files containing trojanized VNC utilities and various malware strains including Ranid Downloader, MISTPEN, RollMid, LPEClient, CookieTime, and a new modular backdoor called CookiePlus. The infection chain has become more complex, demonstrating improved delivery and persistence methods. CookiePlus, likely the successor to MISTPEN, can download both DLLs and shellcode, making it difficult to detect. The group used compromised WordPress servers as command and control infrastructure for most of the malware.
Type Indicator
CVE CVE-2019-0797
CVE CVE-2019-0859
FileHash-MD5 00a2952a279f9c84ae71367d5b8990c1
FileHash-MD5 0ee8246de53c20a424fb08096922db08
FileHash-MD5 1315027e1c536d488fe63ea0a528b52d
FileHash-MD5 2b2cbc8de3bdefcd7054f56b70ef58b4
FileHash-MD5 37973e29576db8a438250a156977ccdf
FileHash-MD5 4c4abe85a1c68ba8385d2cb928ac5646
FileHash-MD5 57453d6d918235adb66b896e5ab252b6
FileHash-MD5 5eac943e23429a77d9766078e760fc0b
FileHash-MD5 739875852198ecf4d734d41ef1576774
FileHash-MD5 778942b891c4e2f3866c6a3c09bf74f4
FileHash-MD5 80ab98c10c23b7281a2bf1489fc98c0d
FileHash-MD5 b0e795853b655682483105e353b9cd54
FileHash-MD5 bf5a3505273391c5380b3ab545e400eb
FileHash-MD5 c6323a40d1aa5b7fe95951609fb2b524
FileHash-MD5 cf8c0999c148d764667b1a269c28bdcb
FileHash-MD5 d966af7764dfeb8bf2a0feea503be0fd
FileHash-MD5 e0dd4afb965771f8347549fd93423985
FileHash-MD5 e6a1977ecce2ced5a471baa52492d9f3
FileHash-MD5 fdc5505d7277e0bf7b299957eadfd931
FileHash-SHA1 8edcd1d8d390d61587d334f4527e569a5bdf915c
FileHash-SHA256 6f9b79c20330a7c8ade8285866e5602bb86b50a817205ee3c8a466101193386d
Stealthy Cyber Attacks: LNK Files & SSH Commands Playbook This analysis explores a rising trend in cyber attacks where threat actors leverage LNK files and SSH commands as initial infection vectors. The attackers use meticulously crafted shortcut files, often disguised as legitimate documents, to execute commands using Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins). The report highlights three specific campaigns: one using SCP to download and execute malicious files, another abusing SSH and PowerShell commands to run harmful payloads, and a third combining SSH and CMD commands to load malicious DLLs. These sophisticated techniques aim to bypass traditional security mechanisms and evade detection by exploiting trusted system utilities. The evolving tactics underscore the need for continuous vigilance and adapted security strategies to counter these advanced attack vectors.
Type Indicator
CVE CVE-2017-11882
CVE CVE-2021-44228
CVE CVE-2023-46805
CVE CVE-2024-21887
CVE CVE-2024-21893
FileHash-MD5 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376
FileHash-MD5 8c69830a50fb85d8a794fa46643493b2
FileHash-MD5 bbcf7a68f4164a9f5f5cb2d9f30d9790
FileHash-SHA1 a90f871f87f0ba08b84a720ded3466ebf667af5e
FileHash-SHA1 bcfac98117d9a52a3196a7bd041b49d5ff0cfb8c
FileHash-SHA1 e6d06bb9afaeb8aa80e62e76a26c7cffd14497f6
FileHash-SHA256 0016e1ec6fc56e4214e7d54eb7ab3d84a4a83b4befd856e984d77d6db8fc221d
FileHash-SHA256 0e2263d4f239a5c39960ffa6b6b688faa7fc3075e130fe0d4599d5b95ef20647
FileHash-SHA256 5b6dc2ecb0f7f2e1ed759199822cb56f5b7bd993f3ef3dab0744c6746c952e36
FileHash-SHA256 8bd210b33340ee5cdd9031370eed472fcc7cae566752e39408f699644daf8494
FileHash-SHA256 a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91
FileHash-SHA256 c67b03c0a91eaefffd2f2c79b5c26a2648b8d3c19a22cadf35453455ff08ead0
Chinese hackers exploit Fortinet VPN zero-day to steal credentials Chinese threat actors, known as BrazenBamboo, are exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Fortinet's FortiClient Windows VPN client to steal credentials. The hackers use a custom post-exploitation toolkit called DeepData, which includes a FortiClient plugin to extract usernames, passwords, and VPN server information from the process memory. Volexity researchers discovered the flaw in July 2024 and reported it to Fortinet, but it remains unresolved. The vulnerability allows attackers to dump credentials from memory after user authentication. BrazenBamboo is known for deploying advanced malware targeting multiple platforms in surveillance operations. By compromising VPN accounts, they can gain initial access to corporate networks and expand espionage campaigns.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 0d54964999408073f9fea299724ad483
FileHash-MD5 32076ae7b19f2669fd7c36e48425acd6
FileHash-MD5 480da467b4687549b38eeea4d4ced293
FileHash-MD5 54570441e91d8e65ea81bb265ba71c8c
FileHash-MD5 564235b40d78f9c763b5022954ee9aae
FileHash-MD5 59ac7dd41dca19a25a78a242e93a7ded
FileHash-MD5 6371a942334444029f73b2faa2b76cf6
FileHash-MD5 707d410a72a630d61168593f17116119
FileHash-MD5 7efb1bc15ee6e3043f8eaefcf3f10864
FileHash-MD5 a2fee8cfdabe4fdeeeb8faa921a3d158
FileHash-MD5 cad4de220316eebc9980fab812b9ed43
FileHash-MD5 ef92e192d09269628e65145070a01f97
FileHash-MD5 f162b87ad9466381711ebb4fe3337815
FileHash-MD5 fb99f5da9c0c46c27e17dc2dc1e162d7
FileHash-SHA1 0563225dcc2767357748d9f1f6ac2db9825d3cf9
FileHash-SHA1 174519da762cf673051ed1c02a6edb9520886fec
FileHash-SHA1 30e33f1188ca4cffc997260c9929738594e7488c
FileHash-SHA1 33c39728a0393d4271f27cc1d85cf3c1610be333
FileHash-SHA1 476c726b58409a8e3e6cf8fb6bb7d46596917e24
FileHash-SHA1 521c5f2fabd1785db1fea5d5bb22f3b16809035e
FileHash-SHA1 5ac2ef263f328980062217135f2d0c359811dbd4
FileHash-SHA1 7aceb8db03b8b8c7899982b5befcaf455a86fe0b
FileHash-SHA1 8e7e8d896ed61bea7a49271e2e6ffc982942e5c7
FileHash-SHA1 8f390335b571297a9eb605576745876666ee7f6a
FileHash-SHA1 9a00f6ca0d9140316f9ae03f79c7511cec32849f
FileHash-SHA1 a77204b049f622b6995c223d0f5f53118cc72f37
FileHash-SHA1 c65817a55b003462d48189875f18fa8bdb57b402
FileHash-SHA1 fd49866245721acc6e7431ec61b066696b72a1e1
FileHash-SHA256 035db9a3bc9bfba542583c9350baa39741018127a27e7e3ebb6e9f50ddb96f41
FileHash-SHA256 041c13a29d3bee8d2e4bd9d8bde8152b5ac8305c1efcc198244b224e33635282
FileHash-SHA256 08e0ed3c9a4c04a4cb83e17f14a4959236dda048336c04e30ab7786b5bf8ffa7
FileHash-SHA256 0b8c9d991162efca3c34d3d97b79f8edfd45ec3e052c4fef080523bacd586d11
FileHash-SHA256 0c4ebc3d96911af9878343ee8dcba7f79a64cf86ae9b8e6cdc7bbb100177b9af
FileHash-SHA256 0f662991dbd0568fc073b592f46e60b081eedf0c18313f2c3789e8e3f7cb8144
FileHash-SHA256 0f66a4daba647486d2c9d838592cba298df2dbf38f2008b6571af8a562bc306c
FileHash-SHA256 151edcd7d877048d5e8fce9919477cbe5c2de4bd65cd46aa228528dd00360db1
FileHash-SHA256 18bad57109ac9be968280ea27ae3112858e8bc18c3aec02565f4c199a7295f3a
FileHash-SHA256 1bfb7c520335f96c1b268bd9e59688fca49e67e5785aa2a5a3bb281484318101
FileHash-SHA256 205e62b04478c0ef69d69970716e5cb9e5d03293157733194d95ea801df3726c
FileHash-SHA256 213520170fc7113ac8f5e689f154f5c8074dd972584b56d820c19d84b7e5b477
FileHash-SHA256 2b4fbd5aa06f70d84091d2f7cca4bd582237f1a1084835c3c031a718b6e283f9
FileHash-SHA256 2bfb82a43bb77127965a4011a87de845242b1fb98fd09085885be219e0499073
FileHash-SHA256 37c74a4a8bbe272da16f956eea69f0dcbf0caeb0d3da72d084502499c124b879
FileHash-SHA256 3d6ef4d88d3d132b1e479cf211c9f8422997bfcaa72e55e9cc5d985fd2939e6d
FileHash-SHA256 3d9f8e1e84e9cfc742bc51742863a325eda1ea459ed6a6a5b2c47710fc171848
FileHash-SHA256 424aaacf3444fe51b9865af3079777a977111cab9a329494f1f12c0a48dbffa7
FileHash-SHA256 4511567b33915a4c8972ef16e5d7de89de5c6dffe18231528a1d93bfc9acc59f
FileHash-SHA256 460f1a00002e1c713a7753293b4737e65d27d0b65667b109d66afca873c23894
FileHash-SHA256 4cbc692e0c914e235b92c55e910c818ec014461462736c56e5328dbcb9971756
FileHash-SHA256 51b83c5732fbfc8da9d333e7daea85725c04f241f27648708d326077a4556717
FileHash-SHA256 55e2dbb906697dd1aff87ccf275efd06ee5e43bb21ea7865aef59513a858cf9f
FileHash-SHA256 5d39dd90ee6e01afbe070030d863385adf5976752274f95f936c1b6241f78d6a
FileHash-SHA256 5fb67d42575151dd2a04d7dda7bd9331651c270d0f4426acd422b26a711156b5
FileHash-SHA256 65aa91d8ae68e64607652cad89dab3273cf5cd3551c2c1fda2a7b90aed2b3883
FileHash-SHA256 666a4c569d435d0e6bf9fa4d337d1bf014952b42cc6d20e797db6c9df92dd724
FileHash-SHA256 7008e312446919cceb73db951af89602aaa9312c0c793b9bbb2e1a306f84d82f
FileHash-SHA256 724351b5cc9ad496a6c9486b8ef34772f640590a90293f913f005e994717134b
FileHash-SHA256 72bfd0f5299809c66a1fea743d5bd6559d031052bc31ced95884aeb860f318a1
FileHash-SHA256 742fd59971ac576e579a45d8f2d4165c4c18b08685880fd457be1651523b5da4
FileHash-SHA256 75dadf4ead9e1b3ad73fb135a5950534d0a9e58bdb4c6f2dbd4ca8b7f66b4a56
FileHash-SHA256 765ef96d1f46aca2c2b816f92e57b92ba8126a601e76a9377d742eb6bb2d95ef
FileHash-SHA256 7d4c9e9b73f74426a975a5f8584059e8c8ca24418e7994ec83ef735c84cf2d31
FileHash-SHA256 80c0cdb1db961c76de7e4efb6aced8a52cd0e34178660ef34c128be5f0d587df
FileHash-SHA256 83c610c4a56aa15a2220d2c3b05e0ff073f6ffb97f892118ae10c03b1bee35b0
FileHash-SHA256 84edc435eac5543a01c5aa1391e73e5dfe49f6b6fd577750204d514f1caaa9b4
FileHash-SHA256 87daf1ee49925271f0f3b2f5671ef028d9e6b79d487a68b879103a752d6fdb7f
FileHash-SHA256 87f9766eb91e966a7599f65d16a696fea6452383d298be65635e63dfac226976
FileHash-SHA256 88e5ca44189dabb4cec8a183f6268a42f3f92b2c6d7c722d7f55efd3dc5334c8
FileHash-SHA256 91b3e5e9ea4b1d7dc188dec0b28afa53f1048b4162ec9dbd60a458b650410585
FileHash-SHA256 a560931baa404189257ec9cbcc2b9449c579018218cc1d70c99b1d36dd292a0e
FileHash-SHA256 ac6d34f09fcac49c203e860da00bbbe97290d5466295ab0650265be242d692a6
FileHash-SHA256 ac7e20d4ddccc5e249ff0c1a72e394f9c1667a896995cf55b97b4f9fbf5de2fd
FileHash-SHA256 af0de88e8b17d628b354b5586da7718b06755d88ddde8c933c8606018e5ed7ff
FileHash-SHA256 b208b73d003a8ee0eb24ce09f7ff515e18229d1836c43159a8e1821615aab19c
FileHash-SHA256 b523cdd1669dbd7ab68b43fd20f30a790ec0351876a0610958b9405468753a10
FileHash-SHA256 be02ce6964d1a10b48897466846e0889c7cf54bdf34133f52bc9226fefb31548
FileHash-SHA256 c3995f28476f7a775f4c1e8be47c64a300e0f16535dc5ed665ba796f05f19f73
FileHash-SHA256 c782346bf9e5c08a0c43a85d4991f26b0b3c99c054fa83beb4a9e406906f011e
FileHash-SHA256 d2ccbf41552299b24f186f905c846fb20b9f76ed94773677703f75189b838f63
FileHash-SHA256 d4aea0bbfe5b309f2464fef8ebb44dd514f8162d41be53b423c64b4acb4a5ee6
FileHash-SHA256 d804e5cde29c10fa3ca56386c147706d9501b6c2fb73f8fd329a24b9acb4c4e0
FileHash-SHA256 dab112f7c765a375f0f12313d1b1e3cf14963113cf7b6f101ba5192a0c3874de
FileHash-SHA256 dbf0ee5e96b418bb6237772262701baf213bf60ede3ed7d90c126117097aa3ec
FileHash-SHA256 e5f0022cd79fad21c760a57fedff48e559aaf80ac0e8bbf44401b465654aba02
FileHash-SHA256 ea2c0cbd35465dad118d69fdbf37ecfb9b0eca461e9854d2790dd98201af6dc4
FileHash-SHA256 ee7c3e2352a4e7bf37e3d76972de1ba493c0be26832cae5978c134155ac7835b
FileHash-SHA256 efff4106cfd21a356b13a5a99c626a4f103f03b9491c0f1f5e135c1e3c84e76c
FileHash-SHA256 fc1c30f6f23a303944d8d04c6c0a7f21b137f70f60ce4f03b2e930f3e98a91da
FileHash-SHA256 fc7e77a56772d5ff644da143718ee7dbaf7a1da37cceb446580cd5efb96a9835
FileHash-SHA256 fd261e970d01f0f123e32baf02f5f32edd0db1ee3ffc6c44d18565ecf1194630
"Breach Report" from UAC-0099 (CERT-UA#12463) The Ukrainian CERT-UA investigated cyberattacks by UAC-0099 against government organizations during November-December 2024. The attacks involved emails with malicious attachments, including exploits for CVE-2023-38831. The LONEPAGE program, used for command execution, has evolved to use encrypted files and .NET programs for decryption and in-memory execution. The group's espionage activities continue to evolve, with changing targets and infrastructure. The attackers use Cloudflare for hiding and ensuring fault tolerance. The report emphasizes the importance of implementing proper cyber defense measures to protect state information resources.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 04833a30808fcc118eed6a748b95fada
FileHash-MD5 19391b5bd1455864dfbfb91f3fe9fcb2
FileHash-MD5 34c68108eb2e381112ae0dfaba0c80c3
FileHash-MD5 4d086e04009690245bbfc6125e4edf42
FileHash-MD5 5c935fbb11100a738b4451a8d85f192f
FileHash-MD5 92cbb147159f3a6225a3580046591d37
FileHash-MD5 946ee0ca399acc84abfed9e41ab3cf80
FileHash-MD5 9ad38f58f3a7d039d8c540365e1e3421
FileHash-MD5 9b9552472a4e41df56662734be9d8ce0
FileHash-MD5 b21d0df863af16c39348238409e8bd9d
FileHash-MD5 b452c8eb4a4aee4978a10b1b9143d15f
FileHash-MD5 bd89dfb42612f5f7c9e28d81609aec8d
FileHash-MD5 c9735877c66597ed493e322bdb9bd30f
FileHash-MD5 e55118b29430970476d743c3993a143e
FileHash-MD5 e5f6ea0297f0f4773697c1675f05fc12
FileHash-MD5 eec19fca4cafc2980f077d934644578e
FileHash-MD5 f73ab22c63de6bbc08a8ddc1edf11270
FileHash-MD5 fb0c754f91836abee965a99cde137fcb
FileHash-SHA1 2d22b64adf12d99ad86e2f17610aa4ba3ec66e28
FileHash-SHA256 025b9bdd156b59b18ab08921572501b6386ae45e8c0c0440855a719ae4b4c24a
FileHash-SHA256 0aaee2882e4a71b25de5722d8936c67d40355e2f79caf994c8e10164468d3272
FileHash-SHA256 0af76e87614126042a2c3409d273d606a4562f99cb9f003a9f9ec0596213a35a
FileHash-SHA256 0b16ee402ad04a673d61af43f461d475d1e3fcbdaf8714a1183ac35056bbae25
FileHash-SHA256 16f809cd9fb1a06f07bb947ea8b6a27f66cfca0947e29666c34ae7b35b6e471b
FileHash-SHA256 25e725e4be880354c42c008e0960ee67481229b299ff61c29c48a23939d9a041
FileHash-SHA256 322de3a4e1d356a7db22d6447807bd7576f91ed1910a57d9e8eb6f678ceb6ab4
FileHash-SHA256 4a42bfc95772e2f6ae58ccb37fe74b5e810f6c2973ec7a70e09884e1fe97e794
FileHash-SHA256 53f4e38d56946a385a681c66d891d3d70c2b2fee1691ff7e7af317955e0d8b88
FileHash-SHA256 5441cb26f32a433b0abd80dfa98a3a30c78df00ca9d2a0cfc5b20c55f3aaadce
FileHash-SHA256 6161be2016a1fd8096b6b43544eb5df97cd3fa73a820b5e0a44618389897d733
FileHash-SHA256 7a0ae128961a6239a2e10059305bb83fa64251bb3f0b44162ec6efdde10fd1e8
FileHash-SHA256 88b64a3eb0dc38e3f8288b977b1cd67af7d4ba959297ac48ef5f06bec3e77560
FileHash-SHA256 8cc89a917ed89a8407aa1e5caa4af585f26946124cf1764e3b178261a27177af
FileHash-SHA256 d4eafc11cd0e4fe417c59db804ca6e8bd8bf9c0d0886627f15165937fcb68395
FileHash-SHA256 eb08f96acba2b316408f66ef0c4f45a42eb207e43c605476405324726e97f9e3
FileHash-SHA256 fa331a275d2f966f42a6168f1cb6fdb919d272b32175985c8bf383f2d800ced2
FileHash-SHA256 fbc4fbb3c2926300ee820ff7044f35231c2a1aeeb74d1f49a6caaec7736739c6
IPv4 160.119.251.83
IPv4 172.86.117.53
IPv4 45.61.157.118
domain captcha-challenge.com
domain newyorktlimes.life
domain webappapiservice.life
hostname gosp16.spd.ics.gov.ua
A Look Back: The Evolution of Latin American eCrime Malware in 2024 Latin American cybercrime continues to evolve as adversaries refine their tactics and techniques. Key developments in 2024 include the adoption of Rust for improved evasion, consistent use of multi-stage infection chains and malspam campaigns, and evidence of collaboration among threat actors. Notable updates were observed across malware families like Mispadu, Kiron, Caiman, Culebra, Salve, and Astaroth. These updates ranged from new delivery mechanisms and obfuscation techniques to enhanced stealer features. Despite innovations, Delphi-based components remain prevalent. The ongoing refinement of these malware families highlights the adaptability and ingenuity of Latin American cybercriminals in sustaining their operations.
Type Indicator
IPv4 191.55.53.136
FileHash-MD5 9d2c907ca5f7b8281fc986ff323e63d8
FileHash-SHA1 e8d6909ee1579f1defe1410a77025736192db16a
FileHash-SHA256 07a58395e20090f139eb0cb3aa1872da4fae8c1630de818a405d3329a7406150
FileHash-SHA256 0f035dced631ac58cfae510cfc61bb1dbef119331a8aea8d5c724a5ddca0f8c5
FileHash-SHA256 129971e378991d14c444db7a7f4c9a16ece750dd6498261d2f35c85baa9bfd07
FileHash-SHA256 148cd318aec19451b9ad17e58e0d97ebaffd46b56d3528608de20b95dd429c45
FileHash-SHA256 15899e250892c2cc6b38d7cdcd2a3934a49c5dca954889564a98d15a52bf3b7c
FileHash-SHA256 2776c052d11f52501871c4cb5a051a1970f002c3f099969040945fb94a158d9a
FileHash-SHA256 27f482377777a1b8e1e679863685f64121f28e1e6e2bba832397269d1763e118
FileHash-SHA256 3972d6c85bb37889265fef3bb3b3ed8494e038ca37e345a515e39b3e95766a50
FileHash-SHA256 46b8e68f5e85935349d0bfc555b9786f7adbac9ec9a9fa174ba0c4f89baa098f
FileHash-SHA256 57e76a7af5bafb4ff06f5f44dcf1182ea5c6a8682651c260f555c52fd441b412
FileHash-SHA256 5d74d439bbb0be789e23bdaafd8cff938e6e686af7c8e215dc945cacc88d131c
FileHash-SHA256 5f6c0ba669db489bc2ff186af312bfe7616f9e4a12706e195225da7168e10db0
FileHash-SHA256 60b32e40ec0a5e59081fa9816a26346892899175ce97c811761423c3533e0651
FileHash-SHA256 aec68d256d8d2caf2d94c5944279806dd4da36d125c7a7d1485c89f718d0db15
FileHash-SHA256 b23aabe16db5f6ccdd061b457d01b94647ed5b5852806624dca277b43d63e188
FileHash-SHA256 ba4e715fe25aeaaf186e8395c2f13ca580457ab4e8ec1c037fd13821d97a6848
FileHash-SHA256 bbf766df1972966b0ab3928d82c61d953e849638bb2c0bab60df3ad8aaacf174
FileHash-SHA256 d7a918b29b4423b2a4be151f1b37c28abc081068c13a04ad8fd70dbd725d659b
FileHash-SHA256 fc258ef827620184253ba37d94efc0043745c29cf3c9f21a6c730f7727d6d076
IPv4 108.165.96.26
IPv4 147.45.116.5
IPv4 162.200.178.68
IPv4 192.101.68.150
IPv4 38.54.57.26
IPv4 84.246.85.94
URL http://84.246.85.94:7890
domain contpt.top
domain massgrave.site
hostname adjunto.pdfxml.store
hostname api.cacher.io
hostname lovecollege.hosthampster.com
November 18 Advisory: Active Exploitation of Critical RCE in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS [CVE-2024-0012 and CVE-2024-9474] Two critical vulnerabilities in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS, CVE-2024-0012 and CVE-2024-9474, have been disclosed. CVE-2024-0012 is an authentication bypass allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to gain admin privileges, while CVE-2024-9474 is an authenticated privilege escalation bug. These can be chained for full system compromise. Active exploitation has been observed for CVE-2024-0012. Affected versions include PAN-OS 10.2, 11.0, 11.1, and 11.2. Patches are available, and organizations are urged to update immediately. Censys identified 13,324 publicly exposed NGFW management interfaces, with 34% in the US. Limiting public exposure and upgrading to PAN-OS 10.2 or later is recommended.
Type Indicator
CVE CVE-2014-6271
CVE CVE-2023-44467
CVE CVE-2023-46229
CVE CVE-2024-0012
CVE CVE-2024-3094
CVE CVE-2024-3400
CVE CVE-2024-6387
CVE CVE-2024-9474
FileHash-SHA256 3c5f9034c86cb1952aa5bb07b4f77ce7d8bb5cc9fe5c029a32c72adc7e814668
FileHash-MD5 3ab22b6f3f0d4271e8d038c05cfbd5c9
FileHash-MD5 c8c08bbe0b78b27d61002db456c741cc
Threat Brief: Operation Lunar Peek, Activity Related to CVE-2024-0012 A critical authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2024-0012) in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software allows unauthenticated attackers to gain administrator privileges on affected devices. The issue affects PAN-OS versions 10.2, 11.0, 11.1, and 11.2, but not Cloud NGFW or Prisma Access. Limited exploitation attempts have been observed, primarily from anonymous VPN services. Post-exploitation activities include command execution and webshell deployment. Palo Alto Networks is actively monitoring the situation, dubbed Operation Lunar Peek, and has released patches. Customers are urged to update their systems and restrict management interface access to trusted internal IP addresses to mitigate the risk.
Type Indicator
CVE CVE-2014-6271
CVE CVE-2023-44467
CVE CVE-2023-46229
CVE CVE-2024-0012
CVE CVE-2024-3094
CVE CVE-2024-3400
CVE CVE-2024-6387
CVE CVE-2024-9474
FileHash-SHA256 3c5f9034c86cb1952aa5bb07b4f77ce7d8bb5cc9fe5c029a32c72adc7e814668
Analyzing FLUX#CONSOLE: Using Tax-Themed Lures, Threat Actors Exploit Windows Management Console to Deliver Backdoor Payloads The FLUX#CONSOLE campaign involves a sophisticated tax-themed phishing attack that exploits Microsoft Management Console (MSC) files to deliver a stealthy backdoor payload. Threat actors use tax-related lures to trick users into executing malicious code. The attack leverages MSC files, which are normally used for administrative tasks, to execute obfuscated JavaScript. This leads to the deployment of a malicious DLL file (DismCore.dll) through DLL sideloading. The campaign employs advanced obfuscation techniques, including multiple layers of encoding and encryption, to evade detection. Persistence is established using scheduled tasks. The malware communicates with a command and control server, potentially exfiltrating data from infected systems.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 2b0bbee382c9bdfcac53f2349a379fa4
FileHash-SHA256 5756f6998e14df4dd09f92b9716cffa5cd996d961b41b82c066f5f51c037a62f
FileHash-SHA256 b33d76c413ef0f4c48a8a61cfeb5e24ff465bbc6b70bf0cada2bb44299a2768f
FileHash-SHA256 b3b2d915f47aa631cc4900ec56f9b833e84d20e850d78f42f78ad80eb362b8fc
FileHash-SHA256 f6c435a9a63bdef0517d60b6932cb05a8af3b29fc76abafc5542f99070db1e77
domain siasat.top
ICS Threat Analysis: New Malware Can Kill Engineering Processes An analysis of a public malware repository reveals a persistent presence of OT/ICS malware, with engineering workstations being a significant target. Two notable clusters were identified: Mitsubishi engineering workstation software infected with the Ramnit worm, and a new experimental malware named Chaya_003 capable of terminating Siemens engineering processes. The research highlights the evolving threat landscape in OT/ICS environments, emphasizing the need for enhanced security measures. Recommendations include hardening engineering workstations, proper network segmentation, and implementing comprehensive threat monitoring solutions across both IT and OT systems.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 0f5d53fc15762a966e8c5ead271e0960
FileHash-MD5 4933a93f7ed1c571e2b1064e9064c846
FileHash-MD5 617ee2ab7f47f3af917e96aa343f905d
FileHash-MD5 856bf67eadb7f1cb7ff60279f083328e
FileHash-MD5 a76ebfae063c9112c40ad34063d2474e
FileHash-MD5 b70c02a9a95afa230a73345558910565
FileHash-MD5 bbaa50bed8d4cc2fd3d2c92d364e9df4
FileHash-MD5 bcb33eea79291f2ac625d0e2d06c461d
FileHash-MD5 e1a36c6e5a05ec1d792acec7def0c6fb
FileHash-MD5 f470a0c437accc0b65a41f71bc787e13
FileHash-MD5 ff5e1f27193ce51eec318714ef038bef
FileHash-SHA1 1dae1485d7a0a73833bd7811bb6d2b44906a5b1c
FileHash-SHA1 21170242c7910587918238bfe29fb477f38b2dd3
FileHash-SHA1 4cec4a0dc5be56b07c1ac4503fdce2e75506d017
FileHash-SHA1 5bdf3ad07816bc25b58867ab3144d70e5337eca5
FileHash-SHA1 7cc8013168f3e2dc186fb6bc75bca6aef8a54e58
FileHash-SHA1 7f14d5fccb492295ce96f9263ff69d8ac274e794
FileHash-SHA1 870361c5843cef92184f7a8fa93dfd7c6acf1b44
FileHash-SHA1 9556cff1d10f6ccefd0ab919ecd5377f9056980c
FileHash-SHA1 9cdf1eca10fc74dcb1849a8bd9f139bbc0847300
FileHash-SHA1 b4fa74a6f4dab3a7ba702b6c8c129f889db32ca6
FileHash-SHA1 fd81716626c152071258b49dfda3eff0da34ebb1
FileHash-SHA256 1b8957804dfa7324d10bf6d7ca22fc038951ab57ab1e6838da9c63ad057c1d20
FileHash-SHA256 1f1035b91db1264eb94aa055cdb50f35f0c27744e77e74b7031e099b112a5837
FileHash-SHA256 517e35b32c4a1dedb155bbd208422cd5c5d34b5ec378712b7e8182fd26473c7e
FileHash-SHA256 5b63ca75f95dc549729bb6261e9dc22f6425547584366188770507bd964221b4
FileHash-SHA256 5ec05f903cc94d559b8eb23aa749805b78de2845bd2317017bc8e50cdceb613f
FileHash-SHA256 69eb2b940ba1fc7bc46699eeb3ff11d921683609f636efae05c0cb796b588a38
FileHash-SHA256 703f0aac78d388f1fbe3800697015d092fa70cea2c01f22f456c8b1aa20a2334
FileHash-SHA256 8b585155cdc7fcbe3d2fa169b307756557ef0d69afb392726f577a73f11d5a97
FileHash-SHA256 9579c6987ac8969d0b0cc0cc2a9da3b034fac41525d96fa79fa02d05813e70f9
FileHash-SHA256 a1d721db0583eed0077bb8ab542ff15a806d24e2dbf13557b12842bd49995354
FileHash-SHA256 ad5922bcc740e5761a708c526d023450ca278168ebcefaaf80f85815d6d6d24e
FileHash-SHA256 b16a67f49ce5aa057236d2bff3e1ab2dcc2c6d3f2551e4520f54e125b2e289d8
FileHash-SHA256 c1826e0d310a6a02f2ee1b5d88b6c0dd48baa8fe1dd99447e98e42c4ca023c96
FileHash-SHA256 fd6c69c345f1e32924f0a5bb7393e191b393a78d58e2c6413b03ced7482f2320
FileHash-SHA256 fd8558b8a4165ebb47f120fa237c2ada306c430ae4cb2109eb644fd8b0b82b15
domain 0g0d.com
domain 432i.com
domain az-security.info
domain grpaper.com
domain x86assembly.xyz
Hacktivists attack Russian organizations using rare RATs The Cyber Anarchy Squad (C.A.S) is a hacktivist group targeting Russian and Belarusian organizations since 2022. They exploit vulnerabilities in public services and use free tools to inflict maximum damage. The group employs rare remote access Trojans like Revenge RAT and Spark RAT, alongside common tools like Mimikatz. C.A.S focuses on data theft and reputational damage, often collaborating with other hacktivist groups. They use Telegram to spread information about attacks and victims. The group's tactics include initial access through exploit of public-facing applications, execution via PowerShell and cmd, persistence through registry keys and startup folders, defense evasion by disabling security tools, and credential access using various utilities. C.A.S encrypts victim infrastructure using leaked ransomware builders and can destroy data using system utilities.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 1fcd4f83bf6414d79d5f29ad1e795b3d
FileHash-MD5 23b873bb66dc09e91127e20825b6cbc7
FileHash-MD5 48210ca2408dc76815ad1b7c01c1a21a
FileHash-MD5 6cbc93b041165d59ea5ded0c5f377171
FileHash-MD5 7e101596eeb43ed2de78bb45d7031f7b
FileHash-MD5 8c70377554b291d4a231cf113398c00d
FileHash-MD5 a2d098f44aba4967826c3002541e3bb8
FileHash-MD5 bcec17275114c6a87d8b7110aecec5cc
FileHash-MD5 fc3a8eabd07a221b478a4ddd77ddce43
Security Brief: ClickFix Social Engineering Technique Floods Threat Landscape The ClickFix social engineering technique, which tricks users into copying and running malicious PowerShell commands, has become increasingly prevalent across the threat landscape. Initially observed in campaigns by TA571 and ClearFake, it is now used by multiple threat actors to deliver various malware types. The technique often employs fake error messages or CAPTCHA checks to deceive users. Recent examples include GitHub notification impersonations delivering Lumma Stealer, Swiss-targeted campaigns distributing AsyncRAT, fake software updates deploying NetSupport RAT, and ChatGPT-themed malvertising delivering XWorm. The technique's popularity stems from its effectiveness in bypassing security measures by exploiting users' desire to resolve issues independently.
Type Indicator
domain eemmbryequo.shop
FileHash-MD5 fac2188e4a28a0cf32bf4417d797b0f8
FileHash-SHA1 1970de8788c07b548bf04d0062a1d4008196a709
FileHash-SHA256 d737637ee5f121d11a6f3295bf0d51b06218812b5ec04fe9ea484921e905a207
FileHash-MD5 5744e74d67f4cc91f262ddb95ac245a3
FileHash-SHA1 890799de73d375478d3a5f0e2b86cec6a0585a91
FileHash-SHA256 5d5b4f259ef3b3d20f6ef1a63def6dee9326efe2b7b7b7e474008aa978f1f19b
FileHash-SHA256 d9ab6cfa60cc75785e31ca9b5a31dae1c33022bdb90cb382ef3ca823c627590d
FileHash-SHA256 e726d3324ca8b9a8da4d317c5d749dd0ad58fd447a2eb5eee75ef14824339cd5
URL http://178.215.224.252/v10/ukyh.php
URL http://185.147.124.40/Capcha.html
URL http://188.119.113.152/x64_stealth.dll
URL https://github-scanner.com/l6E.exe
URL https://ricardo.aljiri.es/ricardo/captchaV4DE/
domain github-scanner.com
domain isomicrotich.com
domain keennylrwmqlw.shop
domain licenseodqwmqn.shop
domain promptcraft.online
domain promtcraft.online
domain reggwardssdqw.shop
domain relaxatinownio.shop
domain rilomenifis.com
domain tendencctywop.shop
domain tesecuuweqo.shop
hostname ricardo.aljiri.es
Hidden in Plain Sight: New Attack Chain Delivers Espionage RATs An advanced persistent threat group, TA397, targeted a Turkish defense organization with a sophisticated attack chain. The campaign used a RAR archive containing a decoy PDF, a shortcut file, and an Alternate Data Stream with PowerShell code. The infection process involved creating a scheduled task to communicate with a staging domain and manually deploying WmRAT and MiyaRAT malware. These RATs enable intelligence gathering and data exfiltration. The attack utilized NTFS alternate data streams and masqueraded files to evade detection. TA397's infrastructure included separate staging and command and control domains. The threat actor's tactics, targeting, and malware indicate it is likely an intelligence collection effort supporting a South Asian government's interests.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 5b232b7417cb3965a942201de88f5055
FileHash-SHA1 f01472fd8ffbcd0c2b54075ee01bde6a2cc4f4e6
FileHash-SHA256 10cec5a84943f9b0c635640fad93fd2a2469cc46aae5e43a4604c903d139970f
FileHash-SHA256 53a653aae9678075276bdb8ccf5eaff947f9121f73b8dcf24858c0447922d0b1
FileHash-SHA256 c7ab300df27ad41f8d9e52e2d732f95479f4212a3c3d62dbf0511b37b3e81317
FileHash-SHA256 f6c77098906f5634789d7fd7ff294bfd95325d69f1be96be1ee49ff161e07733
URL http://jacknwoods.com/gfxview.msi
domain academymusica.com
domain jacknwoods.com
domain samsnewlooker.com
hostname www.jacknwoods.com
Unpacking the Diicot Malware Targeting Linux Environments A new malware campaign attributed to the Romanian-speaking Diicot threat group has been discovered targeting Linux systems. The campaign shows significant advancements compared to previous iterations, including modified UPX headers with corrupted checksums, advanced payload staging, and environment-specific behavior. The malware targets Linux machines running OpenSSH, exploiting weak credentials for access. It employs various techniques such as file obfuscation, reverse shell capabilities, persistence mechanisms, and command and control communication. The campaign also includes SSH brute force functionality and potential cryptojacking capabilities. The attackers have earned over $16,000 from Monero mining alone.
Type Indicator
FileHash-MD5 1fcd346b7e53f1fedb6bf1af57a77a16
FileHash-MD5 3ea482a490c613c126a37ef63cacf1a6
FileHash-MD5 4ceab8769d9d1032e665d7f945c1d106
FileHash-MD5 4fc9b1b6fe4a6d2d3f2e9355f6c2ba70
FileHash-MD5 660b129216c50fc6e38c6f7cb7d9464f
FileHash-MD5 6aab14b38bbb6b07bd9e5b29a6514b62
FileHash-MD5 9e2cb009b4fb131bb2b9e4790e33acb9
FileHash-MD5 d1120ccda583f55c828de4884699e535
FileHash-MD5 d35f12f672804102fffc4d8e4f127ad9
FileHash-MD5 d7dfcda075f868a8b18472a7d189f1cd
FileHash-SHA1 2fda08b2a5a68998a4ac261a64aa33ce3afda0e1
FileHash-SHA1 3bacfb936e56549ee81ecf40590058b1623d51bb
FileHash-SHA1 64af1b0dac905b6f33bf313e1e6878738e232d0e
FileHash-SHA1 84137d1f5e2a5478e830d400c23ba5bd4c07a230
FileHash-SHA1 99bbc5de80abf726d90912f1c4547846ea7c1819
FileHash-SHA1 9f7ea0275e703b3f18f5c5e0fcf901a7acb1dfaf
FileHash-SHA1 a8793f1a94ffa646e542bcaf5bd1fd09d3f677cd
FileHash-SHA1 b7d027995d7ecd1d734404462f6f03fc78c9a219
FileHash-SHA1 c707fd5035011fc968e4b75758ef9142fd895c6b
FileHash-SHA1 e2c121a324922c8d28f4c043cea9d8382d563a2f
FileHash-SHA256 01082cd4733e5f3e2c3f642fa6c0afb5a9489d39ff26a35549263fc0e02ebad3
FileHash-SHA256 4dce8b3beba71b8b44b6576ff2497ed68c6fafebd046822f0d60f8758238e900
FileHash-SHA256 564b21c293bc9d0885dc7a87dbf488a497c98d2103d91f5bbcfdb476eb8b6f4c
FileHash-SHA256 716778bab5fb2c439a51362be5941a50d587714d58a6faa39eefa96aa79c1561
FileHash-SHA256 7bcfcc90d0bd6c85b5b1cc9f287e161020571a0418afb50f2dd67685e9d3a4fc
FileHash-SHA256 8891e7562eb4db253a8582376083ca99b19457680f9d36a5ba4108790740785e
FileHash-SHA256 b351e3f475681ab2e8db5b2bbd2beaf26e5b4fd082ca08eba6fffbc76370113c
FileHash-SHA256 bda2503fc02b11258399cfabd0778a997654b5bd7d30e5e3f5bef54a74b914e1
FileHash-SHA256 c43e506c9b964dddf6fd784bf0cc78b4a2396f47257361dc22e1070e249eae16
FileHash-SHA256 d23491dd351f43f0efad5cee2be80c4049349a7695c0e7de1de632c791356183
URL http://slackforbusiness.net/api.php
URL http://slackforbusiness.net/main.php
domain macpaw.us
domain nextnovatech.com
domain slackforbusiness.net
domain wooofi.com
hostname slackcomtop.aab-e-pak.com
IPv4 87.120.114.219
IPv4 87.120.116.242
FileHash-MD5 3324133875daa3e763f44605c0d0cd6f
FileHash-MD5 3a2692ac5d17250992d3dd9fb214af11
FileHash-MD5 78435bda484ffdee2312b140057d24e1
FileHash-MD5 db8f3437f7951174b76d39d2a2c6c344
FileHash-SHA1 07f200ad0b5a03433a184b442dcd7a688e1ff7a7
FileHash-SHA1 1d56f998bc4f7b649f882a2d730d5e9b1b2e621f
FileHash-SHA1 2ec6af460feabfe9ed37c1955ff266cff63f31ff
FileHash-SHA1 7940c6e29ab9cf6abe5e570f73eed93265962e1a
FileHash-SHA1 7ece24f3b426169d720ab8353e07f0feb6dbc854
FileHash-SHA1 970b45be172ffb9d3192a8d2d015b1c91b216107
FileHash-SHA1 a2101ec53fb0934b23f83c582d3a0bed9f66fd13
FileHash-SHA1 a8a5d0223519590bb48e0b52102786623ec45511
FileHash-SHA1 e0e3456a0b3c06a33cbb4db1f7d1335b777cf107
FileHash-SHA1 f657f695faf2cfd9f6f2188d154f7767da248b9e
FileHash-SHA1 f82b2df5e01abab70085a12388b3ec83c5e33ba1
FileHash-SHA256 26a7661e8b3832ad0ba1308e005019179e064c633fc4585199aa21eab006f2d1
FileHash-SHA256 2f2a0dbe8d190a3ce521cd494f46e74be061a2a2dd9d56586a12e88286fc54f4
FileHash-SHA256 724e3ba433f8330b1cb7a1ebcfe5bfaaf6382fd2d8b0afb5a0b65b11a4b438f0
FileHash-SHA256 766207c362bd73e2690f9d53c40104fbb22284e5b1fd0ef3a3a746a8179a6c47
IPv4 185.112.249.20
IPv4 80.76.51.5
IPv4 87.120.116.35
IPv4 91.92.250.6
URL http://80.76.51.5/.NzJjOTY/.balu
URL http://80.76.51.5/.NzJjOTY/.diicot
URL http://80.76.51.5/.NzJjOTY/kuak
URL http://digital.digitaldatainsights.org/.x/black3
URL http://test.digitaldatainsights.org:7777
hostname digital.digitaldatainsights.org
hostname pauza.digitaldatainsights.org
hostname test.digitaldatainsights.org
hostname web.digitaldatainsights.org
BADBOX Botnet Is Back The BADBOX botnet, previously thought to be contained, has resurfaced with increased scope and sophistication. Recent findings reveal over 192,000 infected devices, including high-end Yandex 4K QLED Smart TVs and Hisense smartphones, expanding beyond the initially targeted off-brand Android devices. The botnet exploits compromised firmware to install malware and secondary payloads without user consent, enabling activities such as residential proxying, remote code installation, and ad fraud. The operation affects multiple countries, with Russia, China, and India being the most impacted. The malware's ability to adapt and spread through global supply chains poses significant challenges for consumers and enterprises alike, emphasizing the importance of trusted vendors and partners in cybersecurity.
Type Indicator
IPv4 103.145.58.236
FileHash-MD5 bd6cb71c8046af6d0851276af7120e50
FileHash-SHA1 5b3aa659cb8dece5c9a14d605c68a432b773969c
URL http://yydsmd.com/ota/api/conf/v1?m=bd6cb71c8046af6d0851276af7120e50&n=WIFI
URL http://yydsmd.com/ota/api/tasks/v2?m=bd6cb71c8046af6d0851276af7120e50&n=WIFI
domain bluefish.work
domain cxlcyy.com
domain cxzyr.com
domain giddy.cc
domain mtcpmpm.com
domain pccyy.com
domain pcxrlback.com
domain pixelscast.com
domain pixlo.cc
domain soyatea.online
domain swiftcode.work
domain tvsnapp.com
domain ycxad.com
domain yxcrl.com
domain yydsmd.com
domain ztword.com
hostname cast.jutux.work
hostname old.1ztop.work
hostname www.jolted.vip
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